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Abstract
The three chapters of this thesis contribute to the following research questions: (i) What
is the role of agency frictions for the performance of mutual funds? (ii) What is the role
of market frictions for the performance of hedge funds? (iii) Do hedge funds profit from
the behavioral biases of other market participants?
The first chapter of this thesis comprises the article ”Are Star Funds really Shining?
Cross-trading and Performance Shifting in Mutual Fund Families”, which is joint work
with my colleagues Tamara Nefedova and Gianpaolo Parise. This article exploits in-
stitutional trade level data to study cross-trading activity inside mutual fund families.
Cross-trades are opposite trades matched between siblings (i.e., funds belonging to the
same fund family) without going to the open market. We find that large fund families
with weak governance and high within family size dispersion cross-trade more and are
more likely to misprice their cross-trades. Additionally, we find that cross-trades are
used to increase the performance of the most valuable siblings (on average by 2.5% per
annum) at the expense of the less valuable funds. More restrictive governance policies
introduced as a consequence of the late trading scandal were effective in reducing the
amount and the mispricing of cross-trades.
The second chapter comprises the solo-authored article ”Beta Arbitrage and Hedge
Fund Returns”. This article finds that a factor capturing the returns of strategies
exploiting the low beta anomaly, i.e. a betting-against-beta factor (BAB), has significant
explanatory power in the time-series and cross-section of hedge fund returns. Controlling
for the exposure towards this factor drives risk-adjusted returns (alpha) of most hedge
fund style returns to zero. In line with theory, the cross-sectional dispersion in the factor
exposure is driven by the access to leverage and the contractual relationship between
hedge fund managers and investors. Finally, hedge funds with a high loading on the
BAB factor outperform funds with a low loading by 0.88% monthly on a risk-adjusted
basis in the period from 1999-2008.
The third chapter comprises the solo-authored article ” Behavioral Factors in Risk Arbi-
trage”. In the context of takeovers, the article examines the trading behavior of investors
around a salient reference point, the 52-week high, and its effect on asset prices. Using
a large sample of institutional trade-level data the article documents a 50% increase
in institutional investor exit at the announcement date for offer prices exceeding the
52-week high. The increased selling pressure leads to significant stock price underreac-
tion and explains a large part of the returns in risk arbitrage. A risk arbitrage strategy
exploiting the underreaction generates annual alphas of up to 11.9% with a sharpe ratio
of 1.63 in the US and in a large sample of over 7000 international takeover transactions.
Consistent with limits to arbitrage, the trading strategy’s profits vary negatively with
the available capital in the arbitrage sector. I rule out several alternative explanations
for my results and finally, using trading costs estimated from institutional trade-level
data and a parametric portfolio policy approach, the paper demonstrates the economic
significance of the effect controlling for other behavioral and rational return predictors
in risk arbitrage.
Keywords: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, Behavioral Finance, Risk Arbitrage, Portfolio
Management, Low-Beta Anomaly
Acknowledgements
In writing this thesis, I am fortunate to have enjoyed guidance, support and insights
from a number of persons.
First, I want to thank my advisors Eric Nowak and Francesco Franzoni.
In 2009 Eric Nowak invited me to pursue doctoral studies at the University of Lugano and
to serve as a teaching and research assistant. From his teaching, research and several
discussions I learned to appreciate the importance of principal-agent relationships in
finance, economics and daily life. Thinking about agency problems led to large parts of
the research in this thesis.
Without Francesco Franzoni this thesis would not exist. Francesco’s PhD course on
empirical asset pricing drew my interest to the study of hedge funds and mutual funds. In
my search for research topics he always took his time to discuss at length different ideas.
In the later stage of my research he helped me out with data, gave me programming
advice, carefully read my articles and crucially improved them with his critical and
constructive comments. Besides having been a great advisor, Francesco also became a
friend. The bike rides to Monte Bre, the ski trips with fresh snow at Andermatt and the
runs along Lago di Lugano were always good fun and full of inspiring conversations.
I wish to thank Prof. Alberto Plazzi for his insightful course in Advanced Empirical
Asset Pricing and for always having a minute to help me with my research.
I would like to thank Prof.Ruediger Fahlenbrach and Prof.Augustin Landier for agreeing
to serve as external members of my thesis committee.
Working in a team is often more enjoyable than working alone. When deadlines ap-
proached our working relationship was not always smooth, but overall Tamara Nefedova,
Gianpaolo Parise and me had a lot of fun with our joint project and became good friends.
I thank them for working with me and for countering my chronic pessimism with their
fierce optimism. I would not want to miss the countless discussions surrounding our
research project and our future.
I want to thank all the PhD students at the Institute of Finance for making my time in
Lugano more enjoyable. Running the risk of omitting individuals which were important
for me in Lugano, I want to thank some of them particularly: Carlo Sommavilla (for
helping me with data, forcing me to improve my Italian (I think it improved indeed), the
dinners, parties and trips), Filippo Macaluso (for all the nice dinners, the nice holidays
and the insights into the Florentine culture), Mirco Rubin (for always helping me with
econometric problems and explaining to me Italian politics), Mihaela Sandulescu (for
iii
iv
all our late evening conversations in the office), Piotr Orlowski (for taking me on bike
rides) and Volodymyr Vovchak (for sharing time in the office).
Special thanks goes to my beloved girlfriend Franziska for all the love and support during
the last 12+ years. While acknowledging the fact that writing a doctoral thesis takes
a lot of time and effort, she also reminded me that a thesis should be finished at some
point in time. Her decision to move to Lugano, made life significantly more enjoyable
for me.
Last, but not least, I am grateful to have an amazing family. It is difficult to overstate my
gratitude to my parents, Hubert and Susanne Eisele. Their support and encouragement
throughout my life were crucial for arriving at this point.
Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
Contents v
List of Figures vii
List of Tables viii
1 Are Star Funds Really Shining? Cross-Trading and Performance Shift-
ing in Mutual Fund Families (joint with Tamara Nefedova and Gianpaolo Parise) 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Mutual Fund Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Institutional Trading Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Summary Statistics and Additional Variable Definitions . . . . . . 9
1.3 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.1 The cross-section of cross-trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 The Pricing of Cross-Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4 Star funds, cross-trading and performance shifting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Favoritism versus Performance Smoothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4.3 Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns 39
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.3 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.1 Hedge Fund Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.1.1 Individual Fund Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.1.2 Hedge Fund Index Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3.1.3 13F Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
v
Contents vi
2.3.2 Hedge Fund Return Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.4 Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.1 Investment style exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.4.2 The Cross Section of Individual Hedge Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.4.2.1 Individual Hedge Funds’ Exposure to Beta Arbitrage
Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4.2.2 Beta Arbitrage and the cross-section of hedge fund returns 53
2.4.2.3 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4.3 A close look at long-short equity funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3.1 Beta Arbitrage and the performance of long/short equity
funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.4.3.2 Do hedge funds hold low beta securities? . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4.3.3 Which hedge funds hold low beta securities? . . . . . . . 58
2.4.3.4 Hedge fund characteristics and stock preferences . . . . . 60
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 Behavioral Factors in Risk Arbitrage 77
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.1 Data on Mergers and Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.3.2 Institutional Trading Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4 Institutional Exit and the 52-Week High . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5 The 52-Week High and Risk Arbitrage Returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5.1 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5.2 The Role of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.5.3 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.5.4 The Role of Arbitrage Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.6 Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.6.1 Transaction costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.6.2 An Investment Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.6.2.1 Parametric Portfolio Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.6.2.2 Optimized Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6.2.3 Are the Profits scalable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.1 Proportional Trading Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Bibliography 129
List of Figures
1.1 Trading Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2 Cross-trading over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.3 Mispricing of Cross-Trades . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1 Factor Selection on the Style Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.2 Factor Selection on the Individual Fund Level . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.3 Hedge Fund Long Equity Beta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 Takeover Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.2 Net trading volume around takeover announcements . . . . . . . . 124
3.3 Confidence Interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.4 Trading Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.5 Out-of-Sample Returns in Risk Arbitrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.6 Scalability in Risk Arbitrage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
vii
List of Tables
1.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2 Summary Statistics for fund-level and family-level regression . . 25
1.3 The cross-section of cross-trading activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 The cross-section of mispricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.5 Favoritism versus Performance Smoothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.6 Mispricing of cross-trades and fund returns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.7 Sorting on fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Late Trading Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.9 Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.10 Alternative proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.11 Alternative methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.12 Lagged Cross Trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Hedge Funds’ Holdings Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Risk Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4 Beta Arbitrage on the Investment Style Level . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Beta Arbitrage on the Individual Fund Level . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 Beta factor sorted Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.7 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.8 Long/short equity funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.9 Do hedge funds hold low beta securities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.10 Which funds hold low beta stocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.11 Hedge Funds and other stock characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Summary Statistics Takeover Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.2 Summary Statistics Ancerno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3 Institutional Trading around Takeover Announcements . . . . . . 113
3.4 The 52 Week High and Risk Arbitrage Returns . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.5 Different Portfolio Return Aggregation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.6 The Role of Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.7 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.8 Time-varying arbitrage capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.9 Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.10 Portfolio Returns after Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.11 In-Sample Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.12 Out-of-Sample Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
viii
Dedicated to my Family
ix
Chapter 1
Are Star Funds Really Shining?
Cross-Trading and Performance
Shifting in Mutual Fund Families
(joint with Tamara Nefedova and Gianpaolo Parise)
1.1 Introduction
Delegated portfolio management creates a principal-agent problem because the fund
investor (principal) can only imperfectly monitor the fund manager (agent), and their
incentives are not necessarily aligned1. This conflict of interest can be magnified when
a fund is not a standalone entity, but belongs to a mutual fund family. In particular,
affiliation with a mutual fund family implies that a portfolio manager is first of all
working for the family and not for the fund’s investors.
In this paper we study how the tension between fund interests, family interests and
shareholder interests impacts a fund family’s performance distribution. Specifically, us-
ing a unique institutional trade-level dataset we examine the cross-trading activity inside
mutual fund families and its consequence on performance. Cross-trades are transactions
where buy and sell orders for the same stock coming from the same fund family are
offset by the broker without going into the open market. Cross-trades are permitted
under rule 17a-7 of the U.S. Investment Company Act and can be beneficial for mu-
tual fund investors since they reduce trading costs and commissions. However, unfairly
1There is a significant literature suggesting that money manager opportunistically try to present a
“rosier” version of reality to their investors, see, e.g., Lakonishok et al. [1], Sias and Starks [2], Ben-David
et al. [3] on window dressing practices.
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priced cross-trades are illegal and potentially shift performance between the two parties
involved in the trade.
Previous literature has provided evidence of illegal performance shifting consistent with
cross-trading. However, due to data availability previous papers infer potential cross-
trading activity from quarterly holdings data2 (see e.g. Gaspar et al. [4], Goncalves-Pinto
and Sotes-Paladino [5]) or indirectly from return level data (see Chaudhuri et al. [6]) with
controversial findings. In contrast, from our institutional trade-level dataset provided
by Ancerno we identify cross-trades as trades executed within the same fund family, in
the same stock, with the same volume, the same execution price, the same execution
date and the same execution time but in opposite trade directions. Thus, we provide a
significantly more precise proxy for cross-trading activity. Additionally, having the cross
trades’ execution prices we can directly assess any impact on performance.
We begin our empirical analysis studying the determinants of cross-trading activity and
find supporting evidence for the hypothesis that cross-trading is used to shift perfor-
mance across different funds. First, cross-trading activity is significantly higher in fund
families with weak governance. Second, in line with the argument that a large difference
in product sizes would allow to move performance from big to small products at low
cost (Chaudhuri et al. [6]) we find that cross-trading activity increases when there are
large size differences between funds in the family. Third, consistent with the incentive
of creating “star funds” stressed in Nanda et al. [7] cross-trading activity is increasing in
the intra-family dispersion of returns. Besides testing the cross-sectional determinants
of cross-trading activity we also study the time-series determinants. At the beginning of
2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) made several amendments
to industry regulations, as a response to the “late trading scandal”. Among the new
requirements, fund families were asked to employ a compliance officer and to enforce
compliance policies. We hypothesize that the presence of a compliance officer dampened
any unlawful behavior inside fund families. Hence, if cross-trading was primarily used
2Using quarterly holdings it is not possible to distinguish whether two funds trading the same stock in
opposite directions are trading during the same day or in different months. Hence, the resulting proxies
of cross-trading activity are upward biased.
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to illegally shift performance across funds, it should decrease after 2004. Our results
suggest that indeed cross-trading activity decreased significantly after 2004.
Families are only able to shift performance via cross-trades when the execution prices
of the trades deviate significantly from the market price at the time of order execution.
In the next step we therefore compare execution prices of cross-trades to the volume
weighted average execution price of the day (VWAP). We find that cross-trades in our
sample are often mispriced, displaying execution prices up to 2% away from VWAP.
Furthermore, the families that cross-trade the most are also more likely to cross-trade at
prices far away from the VWAP. Finally, the requirement to employ a compliance officer
pushed the execution prices of cross-trades significantly towards the VWAP implying a
lesser degree of performance redistribution across funds.
Our aforementioned results are suggestive of performance shifting at the mutual fund
family level. However, our findings about the mispricing of cross-trades are consistent
with two different strategies. First, in line with Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino [5],
Bhattacharya et al. [8], Schmidt and Goncalves-Pinto [9] families can shift performance
via cross-trades in order to smooth performance across different funds in the family. Such
a strategy would help low value funds that suffer because of investor redemptions at the
expense of high value siblings3. We refer to such a strategy as performance smoothing.
Second, in line with the incentive of fund families to enhance the performance of the
most valuable funds (see Guedj and Papastaikoudi [10], Gaspar et al. [4], and Evans
[11]) fund families can use cross-trades to play favorites, increasing the performance of
high value funds while hurting the performance of the less valuable funds.
To distinguish between the two different strategies we study mutual fund returns em-
ploying an empirical strategy motivated by the seminal paper of Gaspar et al. [4]. In
particular, we study the differences in risk-adjusted returns between funds having a
high value for the fund family and funds having a low value for the fund family and test
whether the amount of cross-trading activity has a significant impact on this difference.
Following the literature (see, e.g., Bhattacharya et al. [8]) we define high-value funds as
3We refer to “high value” (“low value”) siblings to indicate funds that we conjecture to be particularly
important (unimportant) for the family, e.g., because they are able to attract high (low) flows or charge
high (low) fees.
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funds with flows in the top tercile of the fund family flow distribution and low value
funds as funds with flows in the bottom tercile. We regress their spread in performance
on the percentage of cross-trading within their family conditional of being in the same
investment style and controlling for differences in fund size, past performance and past
flows plus other family level controls. We find that an increase by one standard deviation
in within family cross-trading increases the gap in the alphas between high value and
low value funds by 22 basis points per month (51 bps if we consider the spread in raw
returns). Additionally, we use mutual fund fees as a sorting variable instead of flows
(consistent with Gaspar et al. [4]) and find similar results. Finally, we replace the level
of cross-trading with the monthly average mispricing of cross-trades in the family as our
independent variable of interest and obtain results in line with our previous tests.
Our analysis is motivated by a recent legal action of the Security and Exchange Commis-
sion against Western Asset Management. The investment firm allegedly executed the
sell side of cross transactions at the highest current independent bid price available for
the securities. By cross trading securities at the bid, rather than at an average between
the bid and the ask, Western favored the buyers in the transactions over the sellers, even
though both were advisory clients of Western and owed the same fiduciary duty. As a
result, Western deprived its selling clients of approximately $6.2 million. According to
the SEC Western’s cross-trading violations were caused in large part by its failure to
adopt adequate policies and procedures to prevent unlawful cross-trading4.
Hence, to make sure our results are really driven by opportunistic practices, we explore
how time-series and cross-sectional differences in family governance affect our results.
We find performance shifting to be almost 10 times less effective after 2003 when the new
SEC regulation was implemented. Furthermore, performance shifting via cross-trades is
significantly stronger in fund families with weak family governance.
Overall, our results indicate that fund families exploit cross-trades to improve the perfor-
mance of high value funds at the expense of low value siblings. This finding is consistent
with the incentive of mutual fund families to improve the performance of their best funds
in order to attract new inflows. According to Chevalier and Ellison [12], the shape of the
4See administrative proceeding No. 3-15688 of January 27, 2014. Similar evidence is provided by the
SEC case against BNY Mellon, administrative proceeding No. 3-14191 of January 14, 2011.
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flow-performance relationship serves as an implicit incentive contract for mutual funds.
Mutual funds earn their fees based on their assets under management and this creates
incentives for them to attract new assets to manage. In the same vein mutual fund
complexes desire to attract flows to the family to collect more fees. Increasing returns
of a high value sibling at the expense of a less expensive fund is optimal if we take into
account the findings of Sirri and Tufano [13] showing that an improvement in the returns
of a good fund disproportionally attracts new inflows, while on the contrary, the outflows
of the worst performing funds are less affected by a further drop in performance.
The incentive for fund families to play favorite is stressed in Gaspar et al. [4]. The authors
empirically document that favorite funds (e.g., high-fee funds) outperform less valuable
funds. While Nanda et al. [7] show empirically that one fund in the family outperforming
the rest of the market has a significant positive impact in terms of fund flows on all other
funds in the family. Thus, strategically shifting performance to create one “star” fund
in the family can be rational from family perspective despite simultaneously decreasing
the returns for some fund investors.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, a large debate in this field
concerns whether siblings help or exploit funds in the same families that suffer because
of money redemptions. Cross-trading is probably the easiest way for equity funds to
shift performance from or to other siblings. However, mutual funds are required to
publish their holdings at a quarterly frequency. Hence, previous literature was forced
to estimate imprecise proxies of cross-trading activity out of low-frequency data. As
a consequence, other papers find controversial results. In this paper we exploit high-
frequency transaction data to build a reliable proxy of cross-trading activity. Our finding
supports the hypothesis that performance is shifted from low value funds to the most
valuable siblings in the family despite fiduciary duties would demand to treat all funds
equally.
Second, we show that cross-trading has an enormous impact on the ability of funds to
generate “alpha”. We find that cross-trading boosts the risk-adjusted performance of
top funds of roughly 1.0% per year on average (causing an equivalent loss for the least
important funds) compared to funds belonging to families that display no cross-trading
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activity. Furthermore, this artificially constructed performance is “pure alpha” because
it is uncorrelated to any risky factors. The mutual fund literature (as well as mutual fund
clients) heavily relies on past alpha as a proxy of a fund manager’s skill. However, our
results suggest that a large fraction of alpha has nothing to do with skill but is simply an
effect of performance redistribution. Consistently, the decreased cross-trading activity
following the late trading scandal may contribute to explain the decreased “ability” of
fund managers to generate risk-adjusted performance observed in the last decade (see,
e.g., Pastor et al. [14]).
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we used. In Section 3 we
document cross-trading activity. Section 4 disentangles between the cooperation and
the favoritism hypotheses. Section 5 presents additional robustness checks. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 Data
For our analysis we compile data from four different sources. First, we use the CRSP
Survivor Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database to obtain mutual fund returns and charac-
teristics. Second, we use the MFLinks table provided by WRDS. Third, we use a table
provided by WRDS linking management companies from SEC 13F filings to mutual
funds reporting their holdings in the Thomson Reuter’s S12 holdings database. Fi-
nally, we use institutional trade-level data provided by Abel Noser Solutions/ANcerno,
a consulting firm that works with institutional investors to monitor their trading costs.
1.2.1 Mutual Fund Data
Our dataset construction starts with a merge between the CRSP database, the MFLinks
table and information concerning the management companies. The merge with the
MFLinks table allows us to aggregate mutual fund information across different share
classes and deletes all funds not trading in equities. Furthermore, it provides an identifier
to match management companies to the mutual funds. After the merging of the datasets
we impose two filters. As the focus of our analysis is on mutual fund families we exclude
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families with less than three family members. The requirement to have at least three
funds trading in equities is driven by our empirical methodology and is explained later.
Additionally, we impose a minimum number of return observations for a fund to be
included in our sample. In our empirical analysis our dependent variables are raw
returns as well as risk-adjusted returns. For the risk adjustment we have to run time-
series regressions at the fund level to compute Carhart [15] four factor alphas. To ensure
reliable estimates we require a fund to have at least a 3-year return history. Finally, we
focus on data between 1999 and 2010 where the ANcerno data is available to us.
Besides mutual fund alphas, we obtain several other variables important for our analysis
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and the Thomson holdings data. On the fund
level we obtain a mutual fund’s size, its fees and its flows. Following Gaspar et al. [4]
we compute fees as 1/7(frontload+rearload)+expense ratio. For the flows we follow the
literature (e.g. Coval and Stafford [16]) and compute them as
FLOWit =
TNAit − (1 + retit)TNAit−1
TNAit−1
,
where TNA are the total net assets under management and ret is the monthly return of
fund i in month t. On the family level we obtain the family size, the intra-family return
dispersion and the intra-family size dispersion. Family size is the defined as the sum of
the individual funds’ assets. For intra-family return dispersion we follow Nanda et al.
[7] and compute it as
ReturnDispersionft =
√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(αit − α¯ft),
where αit is the four-factor alpha of fund i in month t and α¯ft is the mean of four-factor
adjusted returns of all siblings within family f in month t. The variable Size Dispersion
is defined as the difference between the size of the largest and the smallest fund in the
family scaled by the average size of the funds in the family. Additionally, we compute
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the variable Siblings as the natural log of the number of equity funds belonging to the
same family f in month t. Finally, we use Thompson Reuters investment objective codes
to identify the investment style for each fund.
1.2.2 Institutional Trading Data
We obtain trade-level data from Abel Noser Solutions/ANcerno, a consulting firm that
works with institutional investors to monitor their trading costs. This database contains
a detailed record of all executed trades since the client started reporting5. Previous
research has shown that ANcerno institutional clients constitute approximately 8% of
the total CRSP daily dollar volume (Anand et al. [18]) and that there is no survivorship
or backfill bias (see, e.g, Puckett and Yan [19]).
The data is collected at the trade level and contains several variables useful for our
investigation: stock identifier (cusip), tradedate, execution price, execution time, volume
traded, side of the trade (i.e., buy or sell). This information is sent to Ancerno by its
different clients. The identity of the clients is thereby always anonymized. Importantly,
while the client is anonymized the family (called manager in Ancerno) is not. Ancerno
for a limited period of time has provided a separate table including a managercode and
a managername and the variables to link them to the trades. This allows us to match
the Ancerno data with the CRSP Mutual Fund Database.
In particular, we hand-match fund families from ANcerno to 13f/S12 by name. There
are few papers which use the management company identifier provided by ANcerno to
match it with 13f companies, e.g., Franzoni and Plazzi [20], Jame [21]. However, previous
papers focused only on Hedge Funds while this is the first paper to match ANcerno to
mutual fund families reporting to 13f.
Our matched database spans the time interval from 1999 to 2010 and covers families
including 35% to 45% of the funds in the CRSP database. Unfortunately, ANcerno did
not provide us with unique fund identifies. Whether it is possible to identify funds at
all using ANcerno data is debatable (from our conversations with the ANcerno support
5Examples of other empirical studies using ANcerno include Chemmanur et al. [17], Anand et al.
[18].
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team it seems that this is not possible). Therefore, we keep all the variables we obtain
from ANcerno at the family level. Recently, ANcerno has decided not to provide family
identifiers anymore. Hence, our data series stops at the end of 2010, since we are not
able to match trades with fund families after that date.
Our main variable of interest computed from the ANcerno data is the amount of cross-
trading taking place inside a mutual fund family. A cross-trade is a transaction where a
buy and a sell order for the same stock coming from the same fund family is conducted
by the broker without going through the open market. We identify cross-trades in our
database as transactions occurring i) in the same family ii) in the same stock, iii) at
the same time, iv) at the same price and having the v) the same volume in opposite
directions. Figure 1 plots average commission costs for all the trades in ANcerno and
the trades we identify as cross-trades. The commissions paid for cross-trades are about
1/10th of the other trades since the broker has not to look into the open market for
an opposite trade but simply to record it. This result suggests that our methodology
is correct. This identification solves the main concern about the cross-trade definition
used in other papers based on quarterly snapshots (see e.g. Gaspar et al. [4]). Using
our approach, opposite trades recorded in the same quarter but occurring on different
days are not considered as cross-trades. Therefore, our main explanatory variable CTi,t
is computed as the dollar volume of cross-trades executed by family f in month t over
its total dollar volume of trades in the same month.
1.2.3 Summary Statistics and Additional Variable Definitions
Table 1 presents summary statistics over time. Panel A shows the sample of mutual
funds before matching the families with Ancerno data. The average number of funds
per month ranges from a maximum of 1799 to a minimum of 775. These funds are
managed by between 225 and 135 different mutual fund management companies. The
average and median mutual fund size significantly increases over time. While the average
fund size was around USD 1 billion in 1999 it increased to nearly USD 1.9 billion in
2010.
Chapter 1. Are Star Funds Really Shining? Cross-Trading and Performance Shifting
in Mutual Fund Families 10
Matching our sample of mutual funds to the ANcerno data decreases our sample size
significantly. On average our matched sample contains between 20% and 25% of the
mutual fund families from Panel A. Having between 36 and 49 families and 357 and
709 different mutual funds provides however a sample sufficient to conduct our empir-
ical tests. Importantly, our sample is biased toward large families since the smallest
families are less likely to buy ANcerno’s services (this bias has been recognized also by
previous studies see, e.g, Puckett and Yan [19]). In particular, our final sample contains
observations from 8 out of the 10 largest mutual fund families is the United States6.
However, since the top 10 families hold around 70% of the assets managed by the whole
mutual fund industry, the bias toward larger institutions does not seem to compromise
the validity of our analysis.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical tests. Panel
A shows fund level variables and Panel B displays family level variables. in total we
match 206 families out of which 127 cross-trade at least one time. The most important
variable for our analysis is the cross-trading variable CT . In total we classify 732434
separate trades as cross-trades The average monthly cross-trading volume per family is
0.0135% of the total monthly trading volume. This number is small, but mainly driven
by the fact that a large fraction of families are not engaging in any cross-trade activity.
For more than 75% of all our family-month observation the variable CT is equal to zero.
Panel B of Table 2 also contains the so far undefined variable Weak Governance. In
several of our tests we study the relationship between cross-trading and the governance of
the mutual fund family. For this purpose we search in the Internet and in the SEC filings
whether a family was involved in any kind of SEC litigation. Panel B of Table 2 shows
that 36.8 of all our observations comes from families involved in a SEC investigation.
6Given the non-disclosure agreement we signed with ANcerno we are forbidden to reveal the exact
names of the management companies contained in our sample.
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1.3 Empirical Results
1.3.1 The cross-section of cross-trades
Cross-trading is the practice where buy and sell orders for the same stock coming from
the same fund family are offset by the broker without going through the open market.
Cross-trades are permitted under rule 17a-7 of the U.S. Investment Company Act pro-
vided that i) such transactions involve securities for which market quotations are readily
available, ii) transactions are effected at the independent current market prices of the
securities, and iii) the “current market price” for certain securities7 is calculated by aver-
aging the highest and lowest current independent bid and offer price determined on the
basis of a reasonable inquiry. Yet, some discretion may be in order when determining
the “current market price8”.
This section studies how family characteristics and time-series variation in mutual fund
industry regulations affect cross-trading activity. In particular, if cross-trades are used
to shift performance, we would expect the following variables to be correlated with a
family’s cross-trading activity.
Previous literature suggests that fund proliferation is used as a marketing strategy to
attract new clients (Massa [22]) and a large number of funds in a family allows families
to manage their funds like internal capital markets shifting performance across funds
with similar holdings and investment styles. The first explanatory variable used in our
analysis is therefore the number of funds in a family (Siblings). We also include a mutual
fund family’s size in our regressions (Family Size). The high correlation of Family Size
and Siblings (above 90%) potentially creates problems due to multicollinearity concerns.
The next variable we use is Weak Governance, a dummy equal to 1 for families involved
in a SEC litigation case and equal to zero otherwise. We conjecture that families having
7E.g., municipal securities.
8From our talks with compliance officers and professionals in large fund families, we understand that
the pricing of cross- trades is considered one of the most relevant and critical compliance issues. Yet
these trades are usually checked only with a delay and a cross-trade is considered “suspicious” only if
the recorded execution price strongly deviates from the average between the bid and the ask.
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been engaged in suspicious practices in the past are on average more likely to lack the
necessary control mechanisms to detect and avoid illegal cross-trading activity.
Chaudhuri et al. [6] argue that an asymmetry of “product” size allows to take away
relatively minor performance from larger funds to enhance substantially the performance
of smaller funds. In line with this argument we include the variable Size Dispersion in
our regressions.
Nanda et al. [7] empirically show that a strategy of some mutual fund families is to start
a large number of funds with different strategies to increase the chances to create a “star
fund”, i.e., a fund whose performance ranks high among its peers. Such families have
on average a higher intra-family return dispersion (Return Dispersion). We conjecture
that families following the aforementioned strategy are also more likely to use cross-
trades in order to increase the performance of specific funds in the family.
Finally, we study governance not only in the cross-section, but also in the time-series.
An exogenous change in the regulatory environment forcing management companies to
improve their governance was triggered by the late trading scandal. On September 3,
2003 the New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced the issuance of a
complaint claiming that several mutual fund firms had arrangements allowing trades
that violated terms in their funds’ prospectuses, fiduciary duties, and securities laws.
Subsequent investigations showed that at least twenty mutual fund management compa-
nies, including some of the industry’s largest firms, had struck deals permitting improper
trading (McCabe [23]).
As a consequence of the scandal, in 2004 the SEC adopted new rules requiring fund
families to adopt more stringent compliance policies. In particular, Rule 38a-1 under
the Investment Company Act of 1940 required each fund to appoint a chief compliance
officer responsible for administering the fund’s policies and procedures. Additionally,
compliance officers have to report directly to the board of directors to increase their
independence. The compliance date of the new rules and rule amendments was October
5, 2004. From our talks with compliance officers at one of the largest management
companies, we understood that one of the main tasks of the compliance officer is to
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check that the execution price of the cross-trades is within a “reasonable” range from
the mid price of the day.
This regulatory change makes it, on the one hand, more difficult for fund families to
misprice cross-trades. On the other hand, if performance shifting was the main rationale
for crossing trades within the family, the new regulation reduces the incentive for cross-
trading activity. To capture a potential decrease in cross-trading activity we define a
dummy variable equal to one for observations after 2003
Table 3 presents results from pooled regressions of cross-trading activity on the above-
mentioned variables. Observations are at the month-family level and all standard errors
are clustered at the time level. In columns (1)-(6) of Table 3 we first run univariate re-
gressions using the different family characteristics and, to capture the regulatory change
in 2004, the dummy equal to one for observations after 2003. Our results indicate that
families with many siblings, weak governance, high size and return dispersion, and a
large family size have exhibit significantly higher cross-trading activity. This result is
in line with the hypothesis that mutual fund families use cross-trades to actively shift
performance between different funds in the family. Additionally, the average amount
of cross-trading significantly drops (by roughly 8.4 basis points) after the late trading
scandal. Hence, the new compliance policy was effective at the very least in limiting the
amount of cross-trading activity.
In column 7 we run multivariate regressions. While most of the coefficients stay signifi-
cant and have similar magnitudes as in the univariate regressions, the effect of Siblings
on the amount of cross-trading becomes ambiguous. The estimated coefficient is positive
and significant in column 1. After controlling for other family characteristics however,
the sign changes in column 7. This finding is probably driven by the high correlation
between Siblings and FamilySize.
In Figure 2 we plot the average amount of cross-trading across time. The figure shows
clearly that the decrease in cross-trading is not a trend but starts around the late
trading scandal. In particular, cross-trading activity drops significantly after the new
regulation’s compliance date.
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1.3.2 The Pricing of Cross-Trades
Cross-trading is legal when it occurs at reasonable market prices and does not benefit
one counterparty over the other. Conversely, cross-trading shifts performance when one
party buys (or sells) at a discount (or at a premium). In Table 4 we regress the absolute
percentage deviation of the execution price from the VWAP on family characteristics. If
cross-trades were correctly priced we should not observe significant deviations from the
VWAP. Additionally, family characteristics should not matter on how cross-trades are
priced. Here only one leg of the cross-trades is included in the sample, e.g., only the buy
side (since the sell side of the cross-trades is executed at the same price, running our
regressions only on the sell side would give exactly the same results). In our regressions
we use the same explanatory variables as before. We do not include stock level controls
since characteristics that normally have an effect on the execution price (such as stock
illiquidity, price impact, past return) should be of no importance when the trade is not
executed in the open market. Our regressions are now at the trade level and include
only cross-trades. Day fixed effects are included and errors are clustered at the day level.
Almost all variables that predict a larger amount of cross-trading activity also predict
higher mispricing in the execution price. Families with weak governance, more assets to
manage, and large fund size dispersion execute cross-trades at prices far away from the
average of the market during the day for that particular stock (the coefficient of Return
Dispersion is however not significantly different from zero). This result strongly suggests
that cross-trades executed within such families “move” performance. Additionally, after
the late trading scandal, the average deviation from the VWAP drops by 36 basis points
(see also Figure 3). Results in this section suggest that cross-trading shifts performance
between funds. However, we cannot tell whether cross-trades are use to shift performance
to the most valuable funds or smooth performance across all funds in the family.
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1.4 Star funds, cross-trading and performance shifting
1.4.1 Methodology
In this section we explore whether fund families use mispriced cross trades as a tool for
shifting performance toward the most valuable funds or smooth performance across the
family.
On the one hand, the work of Nanda et al. [7] suggests that there is a clear incentive for
a mutual fund family to improve the performance of good performing funds with high
inflows. Nanda et al. [7] find that funds rated as “star” funds by the popular Morningstar
rating experience significant inflows and they have a positive spill-over effect on other
funds in the family. Specifically, also other funds in the family have higher inflows when
there is one “star” fund in the family. On the contrary, a bad performing fund in the
family does not seem to have any negative effect on the flows to rest of the family. Flows
are of particular importance in the mutual fund industry since revenues are usually a
fixed part of the asset under management, i.e., performance fees are uncommon (Haslem
[24]). Hence, in order to maximize fees at the family level performance shifting via cross-
trades can be an optimal strategy for a fund family.
On the other hand, cross-trades can be used by the family to provide liquidity to under-
performing funds to decrease the performance consequences of large investor redemp-
tions. This strategy would be optimal when a severe underperformance of a fund has
a negative impact on the other members of the family that is greater than the cost of
providing coinsurance. Goncalves-Pinto and Sotes-Paladino [5], Bhattacharya et al. [8]
and Schmidt and Goncalves-Pinto [9] provide support for this hypothesis.
The two alternative hypotheses mentioned above have opposite empirical predictions.
According to the favoritism hypothesis, cross-trading should increase the gap in the
performance between the most important funds and the least important funds in the
family. Conversely, the performance smoothing hypothesis predicts that cross-trading
reduces the spread in their performance. Importantly, according to the law cross-trading
could decrease trading costs and, hence, improve funds’ performance. However, it should
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not be systematically correlated with the gap in the performance between high and low
value funds.
It is important to highlight again that due to the structure of our data we are not able to
identify the funds on both sides of a cross-trade, i.e. we are not able to pinpoint which
funds in the family are trading with each other. Our empirical strategy is therefore first
to define groups of funds inside a family which we hypothesize are likely to benefit or
suffer from cross-trading if a fund family strategically shifts performance. Afterwards,
we test whether the difference in their returns correlates with cross-trading activity
drawing from the methodology of Gaspar et al. [4].
Specifically, in our main tests we rank funds according to their monthly flows (see, e.g.,
Bhattacharya et al. [8]). The reason for ranking funds according to their flows is intuitive.
Funds with outflows are liquidity demanders and funds with inflows are the natural
liquidity suppliers. On the one hand, under a performance smoothing family strategy
the liquidity suppliers can buy at inflated prices securities from the liquidity demanding
funds thereby increasing the performance of the outflow funds while decreasing their
own performance. On the other hand, the liquidity supplying funds can buy at deflated
prices securities from the liquidity demanding funds increasing the performance of the
inflow funds. Besides ranking funds according to their flows, in some of our tests we also
rank funds according to their fees following Gaspar et al. [4].
Having ranked the funds, we sort them inside a family into terciles9. Funds that display
intermediate flows are discarded. From the two extreme terciles we construct pairwise
combinations of funds from the top and the bottom terciles and we compute the spread
in their style adjusted performance (4-factor alpha). In order to control for style effects
we impose as an additional restriction that the funds operate in the same investment
style.
For instance, consider a family having 6 funds with the same investment style and assume
that in month t, the funds have all different flows. This implies a ranking from 1 to 6 and
two funds in each tercile. For our analysis we discard the funds ranked third and fourth
and we build the return spread from the remaining funds. Specifically, the observations
9Using quintiles gives similar results.
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in our final sample are the difference of performance between fund 5 and fund 1; fund 5
and fund 2; fund 6 and fund; fund 6 and fund 2.
To understand whether cross-trading smoothes performance across the family or shifts
performance to the most valuable funds, we regress the spread in performance between
funds in the top tercile and bottom tercile on different measures of cross-trading activity
controlling for family characteristics and observable differences between the two funds.
Formally,
Spreadi,j,t = β(CTf,t) + Controlsi,j,t + θt + i,j,t,
where spread is the difference between the high value fund i and the low value fund
j’s raw performance (or 4 factor alpha) in month t conditional on having the same
investment style and belonging to the same fund family. θt are month fixed effects and
CTf,t is the cross-trading measure.
The average spread will be positive since on average funds with higher flows (fees)
outperform funds with lower flows (fees). However, under the null hypothesis of no
strategic interaction, we should not expect a statistically significant correlation between
the spread in performance and CT . Under the favoritism hypothesis we should expect
a positive correlation between the spread and CT (i.e., favoritism increases the perfor-
mance of the high value funds at the expense of the low value siblings). Under the
performance smoothing hypothesis we should expect a negative coefficient (i.e., families
smooth performance, decreasing the gap in performance between high and low value
funds).
1.4.2 Favoritism versus Performance Smoothing
In Table 5 we study the effect of cross-trading activity on the performance spread be-
tween high flow and low flow funds inside each family. We report results for the spread
in style adjusted returns (columns 1-4) and for the spread in 4-factor alphas (columns
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5-8). All of our regressions include time fixed effects and we cluster errors at the time
level10.
The correlation between CT and spread is positive and strongly significant. This result
suggests that cross-trades favor the high inflow funds at the expenses of low inflow
funds inside the family and does not support the performance smoothing hypothesis.
Controlling for a number of control variable does change the results qualitatively. In
column 2 and 6 we include Family Size in the regressions to control for the significant
relation between cross-trading and family size11. In columns 3 and 7 we include a
number of fund level controls. Specifically, to ensure that our results are not driven by
differences in characteristics between the two funds in a spread portfolio we include their
size difference (∆Size), their return difference in the previous month (∆Returns) and
the their flow difference in the previous month (∆FLow). The results suggest that fund
level differences are of no statistical importance. Finally, we also include the family level
variables Size Dispersion and Return Dispersion in the regressions. Columns 4 and 8
suggest that Size Dispersion and Return Dispersion not only have a positive impact
on cross-trading activity, but also independently predict a higher difference in returns
between high value funds and low value funds.
We consider different specifications of our main test. First, instead of using the cross-
trading activity CT as a regressor we use the value-weighted mispricing of cross-trades.
Potentially, our previous results would be consistent also with a big spread in perfor-
mance between high and low value siblings triggering higher cross-trading activity. In
order to show that cross-trades have a causal effect on the performance spread, we want
to show that a higher mispricing of the cross-trades is associated with a larger perfor-
mance gap. To obtain this explanatory variable we first compute the mispricing of each
cross-trade as the difference between the execution price and the VWAP of the day.
Afterwards we aggregate the mispricings for each family in each month by weighting the
different cross-trades by their dollar size. Hence, a family whose cross-trades are on aver-
age priced far away from the VWAP have a higher value of our variable “value-weighted
10Clustering errors at the fund pair level or including fund-pair fixed effects does not influence the
results.
11We use family size and not the number of siblings. Using Siblings as a regressor does not change
the results.
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mispricing”. The results in Table 6 suggest a positive effect of value-weighted mispricing
on the performance spread between high flow funds and low flow funds. Again, this re-
sults supports the hypothesis of a family strategy which shifts performance to the most
valuable funds.
Second, we sort funds according to their fees instead of their flows. Gaspar et al. [4]
argue that high fee funds are more valuable to the family as they generate more fee
income. Hence, families can use cross-trades to increase the performance and the subse-
quent flows of high fee funds. And indeed, the results in Table 7 support this hypothesis.
Although the results are economically weaker, there is a statistically significant relation-
ship between the amount of cross-trading inside the family and the performance spread
between high fee funds and low fee funds inside a mutual fund family.
Overall, our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that mutual fund fami-
lies use cross-trades to shift performance to their most valuable funds. In families where
cross-trading activity is high, the spread in performance between popular and unpopular
funds is greater.
In the next section we study whether the performance implications of cross-trading vary
systemically with proxies for fund governance in the time-series and cross-section.
1.4.3 Governance
Drawing from our analysis in Section 3 we study in this section the impact of differences
in mutual fund governance on the performance spread between high value funds and
low value funds. We start by analysing the impact of the regulatory change due to the
mutual fund late trading scandal.
In Table 8 we therefore divide the sample into a pre-2003 period and a post-2003 period
and run our analysis separately on the two different samples. The results in Table 8
show that the coefficients for the effect of CT on the spread of the performance between
high and low value funds are 10 times smaller after the late trading scandal and not
statistically significant. Figures 2 and 3 show that the amount of cross-trading as well
as the mispricing of cross-trades dropped significantly after the scandal (i.e., it is not
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just a trend). Interestingly, the mispricing of the cross-trades increases again around the
financial crisis. This finding suggests that the value of shifting performance to “rescue”
the important funds in the family during the crisis was higher than the cost of “being
caught”.
In particular, concerning the anecdotal evidence reported in the introduction about the
legal action of the Security and Exchange Commission against Western Asset Manage-
ment, the SEC discovered that most of the (allegedly) illegal cross-trading activity took
place during the financial crisis. This seems consistent with our findings.
In Table 9 instead of analysing the relation between mutual fund governance changes
in the time-series and the performance spread, we examine cross-sectional differences in
governance using our previously defined variable Weak Governance. Columns 1 to 4
show results for the sample of mutual funds where the value of Weak Governance is
equal to 1, whereas columns 5 to 8 show results for the sample of mutual funds where the
value of Weak Governance is equal to 0. Consistent with the hypothesis that predation
is stronger in families where governance is weak, we find our results to be entirely driven
by sample of mutual funds with weak governance.
1.5 Robustness
In this section we provide additional evidence supporting the validity of our results. A
potential issue with our results in Table 5 is that, given that the distribution of the CT
variable is highly skewed, the correlation between CT and spread could be driven by
some outliers. To rule out this concern in Table 10 we replicate our empirical design
using as main explanatory variable a dummy variable taking value of 1 when there is
at least a cross trade in family f and month t, and equal to zero otherwise . We find
the gap in performance between high and low value funds to be 42 basis points (17
basis point considering risk-adjusted returns) higher in families that cross-trade. This
excludes that our results are driven by outliers.
Another potential problem with our main methodology explained in Section 4 arises from
using as dependent variable in our regressions the spread in the performance between
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high value and low value funds. In this way we cannot rule out that the correlation
between CT and the performance spread is driven only by one of the two parties of the
transaction. If that was the case, our results would be inconsistent with performance
shifting through cross-trading.
Hence, in Table 11 we replicate our regressions without matching funds. In particular,
all funds are divided in terciles according to the distribution of flows in the current
month. Funds displaying intermediate flows in month t are dropped. Hence, we create
two separate sub-samples. The first one containing only high-flow funds, the second one
only low-flow funds. In this way each sample contains only funds with relatively similar
contemporaneous flows.
Using this alternative methodology we do not need to impose that a family has at least
three funds to be included in our sample. Hence, our sample is much bigger containing
206 fund families and 1397 funds.
Results in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the performance of high value funds positively
correlates with the amount of cross-trades executed within their own family. Coefficients
reported in column 3 and 4 show that the performance of low value funds is negatively
correlated with the amount of cross-trades. Importantly coefficients are almost sym-
metric. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that performance is shifted from
outflow to inflow funds through cross-trading.
Additionally, in Table 12 we replicate the results reported in Table 5 using lagged CT as
the main independent variable. Results stay unchanged. This finding relaxes concerns
about reverse causality bias. In particular, we want to rule out that a high spread in
performance triggers cross-trading activity. Consistent with a causal effect of CT on
performance, our results do not change when we explore the effect of past cross-trading
activity on present spread.
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1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the extent of cross-trading activity in mutual fund families and
its impact on fund performance. Previous proxies of cross-trades used in the literature
rely on quarterly holdings which makes a precise identification of cross-trades impossible.
To overcome this issue we exploit institutional trade level data provided by Ancerno.
In order to consider two opposite trades as a cross-trade, we require that the trades
come from funds belonging to the same fund family, are in the same stock, involve the
exact same quantity of shares traded, and share the same execution day, time and price.
That provides us with a much more reliable identification of cross-trades in mutual fund
families.
Using this measure, we document that cross-trading activity is particularly high in large
and weak governance families with high fund size dispersion and before 2003. The same
families that cross-trade more are also more likely to cross-trade at prices unfairly far
from the VWAP of the day (up to a deviation of 2% per trade). This mispricing has a
significant impact on performance. We find that “star” funds performance in family that
cross-trade is boosted by 2.5% per year (1% risk adjusted), while the performance of the
less valuable funds is reduced by the same amount. Since average monthly risk-adjusted
performance in our sample is slightly negative and non-statistically different from zero,
this behavior has obviously important implications for fund ranking, fund selection and
fund manager evaluation.
Mutual fund families have a fiduciary duty to treat all their clients equally. Using
cross-trading activity to favor the most valuable siblings makes economic sense since
outperforming funds attract disproportionate flows and have spillover effects on the other
affiliated funds. However, this practice breaches fiduciary duties toward investors since
severely hurts the performance of the less valuable funds in the family. Additionally,
our results suggest that fund alphas significantly misrepresent the real ability of fund
managers to create value for their investors. Studies on fund manager skill as well as
investors choosing where to allocate their money should consider the extent of cross-
trading activity and its impact on performance in their analyses. Finally, we find that
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governance is highly effective in reducing unfair cross-trading activity. In particular,
both cross-sectional and time series variations in family governance suggest that better
governance is associated with less cross-trading and lower mispricing.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
This table provides summary statistics over time for the CRSP Mutual fund database
and the CRSP-Ancerno matched sample. All the variables are annual averages of
monthly averages. Funds is the number of funds, Fund Size and Family Size are mea-
sured in USD millions, Families is the number of families, Siblings is the number of
funds in a family.
CRSP Mutual Fund Database
Fund Size Family Size
Year Funds Mean Median Siblings Families Mean Median
1999 1789 1082 115 8 224 8647 1402
2000 1799 1285 140 9 223 10387 1634
2001 1698 1136 142 8 213 9061 1463
2002 1634 1005 135 8 205 8031 1341
2003 1542 1012 145 8 195 7995 1312
2004 1457 1324 193 8 185 10403 1718
2005 1370 1525 212 8 177 11785 1929
2006 1297 1718 231 8 167 13334 2193
2007 1187 2050 277 8 155 15658 2534
2008 1138 1805 239 8 150 13679 2200
2009 971 1426 201 8 144 9608 1617
2010 775 1897 266 8 135 10921 1813
Ancerno-Crsp Match
1999 619 1846 148 14 46 24715 2529
2000 709 1842 163 14 55 23779 3094
2001 587 1729 178 15 43 23806 2636
2002 655 1615 191 14 48 21924 3142
2003 666 1493 197 14 49 20139 3289
2004 638 1953 274 14 49 25656 4109
2005 611 2097 339 13 49 26484 4385
2006 579 2271 370 13 46 28816 4373
2007 541 2629 445 13 42 33841 7143
2008 498 2370 403 14 38 31321 7604
2009 451 1771 354 13 38 20929 5015
2010 357 2362 491 13 36 23175 5442
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Table 1.11: Alternative methodology
This table presents results for regressions of excess returns and alphas on CT and controls.
Each month funds are sorted in three terciles on the basis of their contemporaneous flows.
Funds displaying intermediate flows are discarded. Regressions are ran separately for funds
with flows in the top tercile (Inflow funds) and in the bottom tercile (Outflow funds). The
independent variables are: Siblings the log of the number of funds in family f in month t,
FamilySize, the natural log of the lagged assets under management of the family; FundSize,
the natural log of the lagged fund i total assets under management; PastF lows, fund i lagged
flows; PastReturns, fund i lagged returns; Sizedispersion, the size difference between the
largest and the smallest fund in the family divided by the average fund size in the family;
ReturnDispersion, the monthly cross-sectional return standard deviation inside the family.
The frequency of the observations is monthly. Time fixed effects are included and errors are
clustered at the time level. The sample goes from 1999 to 2010.
Inflow funds Outflow funds
ex. rets alpha ex. rets alpha
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CT 0.0841*** 0.0418*** -0.0694*** -0.0386***
(3.69) (2.98) (-3.70) (-2.70)
Family Size 0.0002 0.0003*** -0.0003 -0.0001
(1.00) (3.23) (-1.65) (-0.62)
Fund Size -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000 0.0000
(-3.73) (-4.09) (-0.63) (0.53)
Returns Dispersion 0.1117* 0.0839** -0.0606 -0.0594**
(1.67) (2.49) (-1.19) (-2.25)
Size Dispersion 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.27) (1.19) (-0.71) (-1.59)
Past Flows -0.0052 0.0006 -0.0078 -0.0022
(-0.61) (0.18) (-0.97) (-0.47)
Past Returns 0.0761 0.0375* 0.0331 0.0057
(0.88) (1.66) (0.54) (0.34)
Constant 0.0016 -0.0026** 0.0030* 0.0005
(0.75) (-2.47) (1.91) (0.61)
Observations 36,403 36,403 35,442 35,442
R-squared 0.633 0.088 0.659 0.083
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Figure 1.1: Trading Commissions
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Commissions per transaction computed as the monthly average of the ratio between dollar
commission paid per trade and dollar volume of the trade. Outliers (below the 1st and above
the 99th percentile) are dropped. The red dashed line represents average commissions for cross-
trades. Cross-trades are twin trades occurring within the same family, the same stock, day,
time, volume, execution price, but opposite trade directions. The blue straight line represents
average commissions for all trades recorded in Ancerno.
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Figure 1.2: Cross-trading over time
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Amount of cross-trading activity over time. Cross trading is computed for each family f in
month t as the dollar amount of cross traded positions scaled by its monthly total trading
volume in USD. SEC rules 38a-1 and 206(4)-7 and the amendments to rule 204-2 became
effective on February 5, 2004, while the designated compliance date was October 5, 2004 (see
the red vertical line). Average values are plotted for each month weighting the amount of
cross-trading by the number of funds belonging to a particular family.
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Figure 1.3: Mispricing of Cross-Trades
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trade. Average values are plotted for each month weighting the amount of cross-trading by
the number of funds belonging to a particular family
Chapter 2
Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund
Returns
2.1 Introduction
Historically, stocks with low sytematic risk (beta) have performed better than stocks
with high sytematic risk (see Frazzini and Pedersen [25] or Baker et al. [26] for recent
evidence). This result is in stark contrast with the predictions of the capital asset pricing
model (CAPM) and referred to as the low beta anomaly. Theoretical and empirical
research explains this violation of the CAPM by relaxing the assumption of frictionless
markets. In particular, Black [27], Black [28] and Frazzini and Pedersen [25] show that
in a CAPM with restricted borrowing low beta assets can have higher expected returns
than high beta assets. Hong and Sraer [29] explain the flat security market line (SML) in
a model featuring limited short-selling. Finally, Baker et al. [26] propose a mechanism
where relative performance bechmarks can lead to overpricing (underpricing) of high
(low) beta assets.
A decisive feature of hedge funds compared to many other investors is the (partial)
absence of the aforementioned restrictions. Hedge funds are able to use leverage, they
can short sell and they have an absolute return mandate. This paper therefore asks
whether parts of the return in the hedge fund industry are generated by profiting from
39
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the regulatory or contractual restrictions imposed on other markets participants, i.e.
do hedge funds take advantage of the low beta anomaly and invest in beta-arbitrage
strategies?
The findings of this paper are easily summarized. First, most hedge fund styles have
a significant exposure to a factor capturing the returns from beta-arbitrage strategies.
More importantly, after controlling for exposure to beta-arbitrage strategies hedge funds
in the aggregate and on the style level did not generate any significant abnormal returns
for their investors in the period from 1994 to 2008. Second, dispersion in the exposure
to beta-arbitrage strategies predicts returns in the cross-section of individual hedge fund
returns. Third, the dispersion in the exposure to beta-arbitrage strategies is driven by
access to leverage and risk aversion in line with theory. Overall, my results suggest
that a significant part of the superior performance of hedge funds compared to other
money managers is not driven by superior skill, but stems from more flexibility and less
regulatory burdens.
The empirical analysis starts with an examination of hedge fund style returns. I run time-
series regression of hedge fund style returns on the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model
augmented with a factor capturing the returns from beta-arbitrage strategies. The factor
I use as a proxy for the returns from beta-arbitrage strategies is thereby throughout the
paper the Betting-against-Beta factor (BAB) factor of Frazzini and Pedersen [25] which
simulates the returns from a market-neutral strategy going long low beta assets and
short high beta assets inside an asset class.
I find 12 out of 14 hedge fund styles have a statistically significant loading on the BAB
factor in the period from 1994 to 2008 and including the BAB factor as an additional
benchmark return into the performance decomposition improves the adjusted R-square
of the time series regression for some styles by more than 10%. Furthermore, using the
Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model 10 out of 14 indices exhibit significant (at the
5% level) benchmark-adjusted returns in the period from 1994 to 2008. Adding the
BAB factor to the model decreases the number of hedge fund styles with significant
benchmark-adjusted returns to 4. Even for the styles where the benchmark-adjusted re-
turns stay statistically significant, the economic magnitude decreases by 50% on average.
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This result is robust to the inclusion of other factors in stepwise regression framework
like for example a liquidity risk factor as proposed by Sadka [31].
I also repeat the above analysis on the individual fund level. Depending on the length
of the time-series between 30% and 40% of all funds in the TASS data base have a
positive and significant loading on the BAB factor and the median alpha of hedge funds
decreases from around 4% annually to 2.5%. Using a stepwise regression framework I
find the BAB factor to the be the second most selected factor after the market factor.
After documenting a significant explanatory power in the time-series of hedge fund
return the paper studies the cross-section of hedge fund returns. The paper asks whether
dispersion in the loading on the beta arbitrage strategy is able to predict cross-sectional
differences in hedge fund returns. I sort hedge funds at the beginning of each year into
ten portfolios according to their factor loadings on the BAB factor estimated using the
previous 3,4,or 5 years of data. These portfolios have a significant spread in their returns
after adjusting for risk with the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model. Specifically,
the portfolio with the highest loading on the BAB factor (portfolio 10) outperforms
the portfolio with the lowest loading on the BAB factor (portfolio 1) by 0.9% monthly.
This result suggests that exposure to beta-arbitrage strategies can explain a significant
amount of cross-sectional variation in hedge fund returns and including the BAB factor
in a benchmark model for measuring hedge fund performance can a have a significant
effect on performance rankings. This result is robust to the addition of other risk controls
like the Fama and French [32] value factor, the Carhart [15] momentum factor, the
Pastor and Stambaugh [33] liquidity risk factor and correcting for biases in hedge fund
databases.
Finally, the paper takes a close look at long/short equity funds. Long/short equity
funds constitute the largest investment style in the TASS databases and therefore are of
particular interest. Furthermore, SEC regulation allows me to get quarterly snapshots
of their long equity holdings which helps to gain further insight into the relation between
hedge fund returns and the low beta anomaly. I find that the results documented above
hold in the subsample of long/short equity and are even stronger.
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Turning to the long equity holdings the first finding of the paper is that stocks held
by hedge funds have on average a higher market beta than for example stocks held by
mutual funds. This result runs counter to the high BAB factor exposure in the time-
series regressions. The BAB factor however consists of a long position in low beta assets
and a short position in high beta assets. Hence, the significant BAB exposure can be
due to significant short-selling of high beta stocks. Making the simplifying assumption
that most of the outstanding short-interest can be attributed to hedge fund trading (see
e.g. Ben-David et al. [34]) I find that indeed the systematic risk of hedge fund short
positions exceeds significantly the systematic risk of their long positions. Thus, the
aggregate exposure to the BAB factor can be mainly attributed to hedge funds’ short
selling activity in high beta stocks.
Cross-sectional variation in the BAB factor exposure is however not only driven by
variation in the short exposure to high beta stocks. I find that funds with high BAB
exposure hold stocks with significantly lower systematic risk than funds with a low
exposure to the BAB factor. Furthermore, results from cross-sectional regressions of
hedge funds’ long-side portfolio beta on hedge fund characteristics lend considerable
support to the theories of Black [27] and Frazzini and Pedersen [25].
In particular, Black [27] and Frazzini and Pedersen [25] suggest that the demand for
market beta should vary with the tightness of an agent’s borrowing constraint. The
tightness of the borrowing constraint thereby depends on agents’ access to leverage and
risk aversion. To proxy for a hedge fund manager’s risk aversion I draw from prior litera-
ture and use as explanatory variables the existence of high-water mark provisions, share
restrictions, personal capital invested in the fund and incentive fees (see e.g. Goetzmann
et al. [35], Hodder and Jackwerth [36] and Panageas and Westerfield [37]). To proxy for
the access to leverage I include a dummy variable equal to one when a fund reports to use
leverage. Funds using leverage, with personal capital invested in the fund, a high-water
mark and long redemption notice periods hold on average stocks with lower betas. To
the contrary, the demand for beta positively correlates with incentive fees in line with
the hypothesis that the asymmetric pay-off of incentive fees increase risk-taking.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews related literature.
Section 2 summarizes the data used in this paper. Section 3 presents empirical results
and Section concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to different streams of literature. First, it contributes to the
literature on hedge fund performance measurement. Finding an appropriate benchmark
model to measure the performance of active investors poses an ongoing challenge to
academic researchers and practitioners. This holds true in particular for hedge funds.
While the performance of many mutual funds is largely explained with the Fama and
French [32] model augmented with the Carhart [15] factor, this is not true for hedge
funds. Reasons for the weak explanatory power for hedge fund returns are manifold.
Hedge funds often follow dynamic trading strategies and are able to invest across many
asset classes. One way researchers have tackled this problem is through the development
of asset based performance factors that are replicating the pay-offs to such strategies (see
Fung and Hsieh [38], Fung and Hsieh [39]). Another way to improve the explanatory of
factor models is to use conditional factor models where factor exposures are allowed to
change depending on macroeconomic variables, fund performance or liquidity conditions.
In a recent paper for example Patton and Ramodarai [40] propose an empirically very
succesful conditional factor model for hedge funds where factor exposures are changing
with high frequency movements in conditioning information. This paper belongs to the
former category by proposing to use the BAB factor as an additional factor in hedge
fund benchmark models. Different from for example the Fung and Hsieh [30] trend-
following factors, exposure to the BAB factor not only explains hedge fund returns in
the time-series of hedge fund returns, but also in the cross-section. Other recent papers
finding factor exposures that predict returns in the cross-section of hedge fund return
are Buraschi et al. [41], Sadka [31] and Bali et al. [42]. Buraschi et al. [41] find that
exposure to correlation risk predicts return in the cross-section of hedge fund returns,
Sadka [31] shows a positive relation between hedge funds’ liquidity risk exposure and
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future returns and the results of Bali et al. [42] suggest that exposure to the default
spread (inflation) predicts positively (negatively) future hedge fund returns.
Second, it relates to the literature which links cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund
returns to contractual agreements between investors and managers. Agarwal et al. [43]
show that managers with more discretion and more incentives achieve higher returns
for their investors. Aragon [44] argues that hedge funds with share restrictions in place
achieve higher returns for their investors because they invest in more illiquid securities.
My results suggest that these effects are partially due to the effect that e.g. higher
discretion in the form of longer redemption notice periods leads to a stronger tilt towards
a beta arbitrage strategy.
Third, it contributes to the asset pricing literature by finding support for the empirical
predictions of asset pricing models with borrowing constraints (e.g. Black (1972) and
Frazzini and Pedersen [25]).
2.3 Data and Methodology
2.3.1 Hedge Fund Data
2.3.1.1 Individual Fund Data
The paper uses return data (net-of-fees) reported in the TASS database between 1994
and 2008. Before 1994 TASS only reports data on ”live” hedge funds. To mitigate sur-
vivorship bias the study focuses therefore on the post 1994 period when the ”Graveyard”
database containing dead hedge funds became available. Besides restricting the sample
period I impose several other filters on the data. First, I only keep funds with a monthly
reporting frequency. Second, I only keep funds with at least 18 observations as I need
a sufficient number of observations to run the factor modeIs. Third, I only keep funds
reporting their returns in USD. After imposing these filters I am left with 7355 hedge
funds. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for these funds.
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Panel A summarizes the data by year. Column 1 shows the number of funds in the
sample. This number is steadily increasing from around 1000 in 1994 to around 5000
in 2007. In 2008 the number of hedge funds in the sample decreases the first time
due to the financial crisis. Average monthly returns are reported in column 2. The
year 2008 was by far the worst year for the industry measured by average returns or
median returns (column 7). Furthermore the standard deviation of hedge fund returns
significantly increased during that period.
Panel B shows the same statistics as Panel A by investment style. Each hedge fund in
TASS reports to follow one of 11 investment styles: Long/Short Equity Hedge, Event
Driven, Multi-Strategy, Equity Market Neutral, Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income
Arbitrage, Global Macro, Dedicated Short Bias, Emerging Markets or Managed Futures.
Long/Short Equity Hedge constitute the largest investment style in the hedge fund
universe, whereas Dedicated Short Bias is by far the smallest investment style. Although
these classifications offer some insight into a fund’s investments, there is still a lot of
heterogeneity inside the different styles. An event driven fund for example can be a pure
merger arbitrageur or a pure distressed securities investor.
Panel C reports cross-sectional statistics for different fund characteristics. The distri-
bution of assets under management (AUM) is highly skewed with a mean of USD 121
million and a median of USD 32 million. The median of the management fee and incen-
tive fees are 1.5% and 20%. Panel C also reports other variables of interest which will
be defined later. All the statistics reported in Panel C are however very closely to the
ones reported in other studies (see Bali et al. [42] or Agarwal et al. [43]).
2.3.1.2 Hedge Fund Index Data
I obtain hedge fund index data from TASS. An alternative to using the provided indices
by TASS is to construct the indices from the individual fund data. The TASS indices
however offer a finer style classification and are widely used by practitioners. The TASS
indices are value-weighted and funds have to meet several criteria like e.g. a certain size
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to be included in the index calculation1. Due to the value-weighting the indices are well
suited to gain insight into the hedge fund industry.
2.3.1.3 13F Data
For the holdings data I extract quarterly 13F filings which have to be submitted to
the SEC on a quarterly frequency by investment advisors with investment discretion
in excess of USD 100 million at the end of the previous year. A drawback of the 13F
data is that 13F filers do not have to disclose their full portfolios but only holdings
in qualified securities as specified by the SEC and holdings which exceed certain size
thresholds. Important for the analysis of hedge funds is the non-disclosure of short
positions. Hence, in the holdings analysis the paper looks only at the long positions and
inside the long holdings only at the equity positions.
To identify hedge funds among the 13F institutions I use first a proprietary list of hedge
funds from Thomson-Reuters.2 Afterwards I match the 13F institutions manually to
the TASS database to obtain fund characteristics. As the 13F filing are reported on
the management company level, which often includes several hedge funds, I aggregate
the characteristics at the management company level by computing an AUM weighted
average of each characteristic. After the manual match the sample includes 650 hedge
funds belonging to 250 management companies. Finally, I focus on Long/Short Equity
Funds, which leaves me with 125 management companies.
Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the smaller sample of hedge fund management
companies matched with TASS. I focus on data after 1998 to have a sufficient number
of observations in the cross section. Row 1 shows the market beta of hedge funds’
long equity holdings. The other rows report assets under management (AUM) from
TASS, the size of the long equity portfolio from 13F, the incentive fee in percent, the
management fee in percent, the redemption notice period in days, the lockup period in
month, and a dummy which indicates whether a hedge fund is using leverage.
1More details on the index construction can be obtained from www.hedgeindex.com
2I am grateful to Francesco Franzoni for providing this list
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The most obvious difference between Table 1 Panel C and Table 2 is the average size of
the funds. Funds in Table 2 are significantly larger due to two facts. First, the statistics
are reported on the level of the management company. Second, as mentioned above
hedge funds only have to report to the SEC when their AUM exceeds USD 100 million.
2.3.2 Hedge Fund Return Decomposition
The literature on portfolio performance evaluation aims to separate the part of a port-
folio’s return which is due to the genuine skill of the manager (alpha) from the part
which can be explained through exposures to passive benchmarks. It is thereby irrel-
evant whether the passive benchmark captures an economic risk factor or whether the
passive benchmarks capture some source of mispricing. To decompose the performance
a factor model of the form
ri,t = αi +
K∑
k=1
βki F
k
t + 
i
t
is used, where ri,t is the return of fund i at time t, αi,t is the regression intercept of the
multivariate regression of fund returns on K different benchmark returns F kt and beta
k
i
are the slope coefficients.
This paper uses for most of the analysis the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model as
a benchmark model. The seven factors are the excess return on the market (MKTRF)
and the small minus big factor (SMB) of Fama and French [32]; the excess returns on
portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX), commodities (PTFS-
COM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the maximum possible
return to trend-following strategies on their respective underlying assets; the change in
the constant maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond over the 3-month T-bill
(BD10RET); and the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the 10-year
Treasury bond(BAAMTSY).
In order to test whether hedge funds are loading on a strategy taking advantage of the
low beta anomaly I augment the Fung and Hsieh [30] model with the betting against
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beta factor of Frazzini and Pedersen [25] 3. The BAB factor is a long short portfolio
taking a leveraged long position in low beta assets and a deleveraged short position high
beta assets. The levels of leverage for the long and short side are thereby chosen in such
a way that the resulting long-short portfolio is beta neutral. Frazzini and Pedersen [25]
construct BAB factors for a number of different asset classes including US equities, in-
ternational equities, currencies, commodities, CDS, treasuries, corporate bonds, country
bonds and equity indices. Due to the discretion of their trading behavior many hedge
funds are able to invest in any asset class. Instead of trying to pick a specific BAB factor
I therefore simply take the composite BAB factor provided by Frazzini and Pedersen
[25].
While the factors of Fung and Hsieh [30] are the most commonly used ones, there are
a number of other benchmarks hedge funds are exposed to. First, long/short equity
funds often exhibit significant exposures to the value factor (hml) of Fama and French
[32] and the momentum factor (umd) of Carhart [15]. Second, the recent literature
stresses the importance of liquidity risk to understand hedge fund returns. Sadka [31]
for example finds market liquidity risk to be an important explanatory variable in the
time-series and cross-section of hedge fund returns. Therefore I use the liquidity risk
factor of Pastor and Stambaugh [33] in my analysis. As a second liquidity risk factor
I use the leverage mimicking portfolio (LMP) of Adrian et al. [45]. Adrian et al. [45]
create a factor that mimicks the leverage of financial intermediaries and show that this
factor has very strong explanatory in the cross-section of assets 4. In particular, their
results suggest that their factor is able to explain the cross-section of returns of beta
sorted portfolios.
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the different factors. The highest average returns
during the sample period generated the LMP factor with 0.88% per month. The LMP
factor is closely followed by the momentum factor (umd) with monthly returns of 0.87%
3The authors made their BAB factors available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/lpederse/.
4Adrian et al. [45] compute first quarterly shocks to the leverage of the financial intermediary sector
and in the second step they project the leverage shocks on the 6 book-to-market and size sorted portfolios
of Fama and French [32] and the momentum factor of Carhart [15] to get a traded factor. The estimated
parameters of the projection are reported in Adrian et al. [45] and are used in this paper for the
computation of the LMP factor
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per month. On a risk-adjusted basis however the picture changes. The standard devi-
ation of the LMP factor and the momentum strategy are both more than three times
the standard deviation of the BAB factor. Hence, with a sharpe ratio higher than one
during the period from 1994 to 2008 the BAB strategy is significantly more attractive
than the returns of other mimicking portfolios.
2.4 Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns
2.4.1 Investment style exposure
I start the empirical analysis with an examination of different hedge fund investment
styles to understand whether hedge funds in the aggregate generate parts of their returns
through beta arbitrage strategies. In the following analysis I use the aforementioned
factor model to decompose hedge fund returns into skill and exposures to different
passive benchmarks.
Panel A of Table 4 shows results using the Fung and Hsieh [30] model. In order to
interpret the intercepts of the time-series regressions as alphas I follow Sadka [31] and
replace the term spread with the Barclay’s 7-10 year treasury index minus the short-
term rate and changes in the credit spread with the Barclay’s corporate bond Baa
index minus the 7-10 year treasury index. Column 1 of Panel A finds risk-adjusted
returns in the hedge fund industry of 0.3% per month or 4% annually between 1994 and
2008. The highest risk-adjusted returns were generated by funds following Global Macro
strategies. The Global Macro index generated risk-adjusted returns of 0.6% monthly or
7.5% annually over the period from 1994 to 2008. Most of the investment styles are not
market neutral, but have an economically and statically significant exposure to market
risk. Other important risk factors are the size factor (SMB) of Fama and French [32],
the credit spread and the term spread.
In Panel B of Table 4 the BAB factor is added as a regressor. The results suggest
that except for the Dedicated Short Bias and the Equity Market Neutral strategy the
BAB factor is significantly correlated with hedge fund style returns. The explanatory
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power of the BAB factor is thereby particularly strong for Convertible Arbitrage(CA)
funds and Fixed Income Arbitrage (FIA) funds. The time-series R2 increases from
0.29 to 0.4 for CA funds and from 0.32 to 0.47 for the FIA funds. Controlling for
exposure to the BAB factor Panel B of Table 4 shows that the only hedge fund styles
delivering significant risk-adjusted returns during the period 1994 to 2008 were Equity
Market Neutral, Event Driven and the subindex Distressed Securities. This compares
to 10 indices with significant risk-adjusted returns using the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven
factor model. The risk-adjusted returns for Fixed-Income Arbitrage funds even turn
significantly negative.
The significant explanatory power of the BAB factor in the time-series of hedge fund
returns can be due to other omitted factors in the regressions. Important candidates for
such omitted factors are liquidity risk factors and a value factor. Frazzini and Pedersen
[25] show theoretically that the returns of the BAB factor are strongly correlated with
funding liquidity risk. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [46] furthermore argue that there
exists a close relationship between funding liquidity risk and market liquidity risk. In
their model the unwinding of trades from arbitrageurs facing funding liquidity shocks
can lead to a deterioration of market liquidity. In line with this idea Sadka [31] and
Teo [47] find a strong correlation between market liquidity risk and hedge fund returns.
Thus, the correlation between the BAB factor and hedge fund returns is potentially due
to the correlation with market liquidity risk. Franzoni [48] finds a strong decrease in the
market beta of value stocks in recent years. Hence, the significant loading on the BAB
factor could also be explained by a value tilt in hedge fund portfolios.
In order to test whether hedge funds’ exposure towards beta arbitrage strategies is a
dominant factor after considering a number of other potential benchmark strategies I
employ the stepwise regression framework used by Agarwal and Naik [49]. In a stepwise
regression variables are added or deleted as explanatory variables depending on the F-
Value which eventually leaves a small set of variables maximizing the in-sample fit of the
regression. A drawback of stepwise regressions is in-sample overfitting and a breakdown
of standard statistical inference. Agarwal and Naik [49] however empirically find a good
out-of-sample performance of the extracted factors and the authors suggest that the
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benefits of the stepwise regression approach outweigh the costs in the case of hedge fund
performance attribution.
I run the stepwise regressions using the 12 benchmark returns from Table 3 and show
the results graphically in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows for every TASS index return its
average annual excess return and the contribution of the exposure to a beta arbitrage
strategy to this performance. If the stepwise regression did not extract the BAB factor
as a dominant return source, the contribution to the performance of the TASS index
return is zero. If the stepwise regression did extract the BAB factor as a dominant
factor, the contribution is equal to the factor exposure times the average return of the
BAB factor. Figure 1 suggests the BAB factor contributes significantly to the returns
of 10 out of the 14 indices. For the broad hedge fund index, the long/short equity
index and several event driven strategies the economic contribution of the BAB factor is
around 20%. Especially high is the economic contribution to the strategies convertible
arbitrage, fixed income and multi-strategy. For some of these strategies the economic
contribution even exceeds 100%.
Overall the results from this section suggest that significant parts of the hedge fund
industry are loading on a beta arbitrage strategy and controlling for this exposure has
a significant impact on estimated alphas. Specifically, using the Fung and Hsieh [30]
seven factor model augmented with the BAB factor only 4 out of 14 hedge fund styles
delivered statistically significant risk-adjusted returns in the period from 1994 to 2008.
To the contrary, using only the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model 10 out of 14
hedge fund styles delivered positive and significant risk-adjusted returns.
2.4.2 The Cross Section of Individual Hedge Funds
The previous section examines hedge fund returns on the index level. In this section I
first study the number of individual hedge funds having a positive and significant loading
on the BAB factor. Second, I analyze whether cross-sectional dispersion in the loading
on the BAB factor can explain differences in hedge fund expected returns. If the loading
on the BAB factor can explain differences in hedge fund expected returns, augmenting
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the Fung and Hsieh [30] model with the BAB factor can have important consequences
for hedge fund performance rankings with a significant impact on manager selection.
2.4.2.1 Individual Hedge Funds’ Exposure to Beta Arbitrage Strategies
I decompose the returns of all hedge funds in the dataset using the Fung and Hsieh [30]
model augmented with the BAB factor of Frazzini and Pedersen [25]. Individual hedge
funds often have very short time series and a recent paper by Bollen [50] stresses the
problems of making inferences with such short histories. In particular, the paper points
out the problem of finding spurious results using short return histories. To reduce these
problems I report results with different required minimum return histories ranging from
3 years to 10 years.
Depending on the minimum number of required observations Panel A Table 5 finds that
between 30% and 40% of all funds have a significant exposure. In contrast, the number
of funds having a negative and significant loading on the BAB factor is very small.
Panel B looks at different investment styles requiring a fund to have a minimum of 36
time series observations to be included. Among the investment styles with the largest
fraction of positive and significant loadings on the BAB factor are convertible arbitrage
and event driven funds.
In line with the results from the previous section Table 5 also shows that the BAB
factor has a significant effect on risk-adjusted returns. Using the Fung and Hsieh [30]
seven factor model the median hedge fund alpha is around 4% annually. Adding the BAB
factor decreases annual alpha by an economically significant magnitude of 1.5% annually.
Among the different investment styles exposure to the BAB factor has a strong impact
on risk-adjusted performance in particular for managed futures, convertible arbitrage
and emerging markets. The annualized alpha for managed futures decreases from 6.1%
to 3.7% and for emerging market funds from 7.1% to 1.7%.
Finally, similar to the analysis on the index level I also employ the stepwise regression
framework to the individual funds. Using the 12 benchmark returns from Table 2 I run
a stepwise regression for every hedge fund with a return history of at least 36 month
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and Figure 2 shows the 5 most often selected benchmark returns. For every benchmark
the first bar shows the percentage of funds choosing the benchmark and the second bar
shows the percentage of funds having a positive exposure to the benchmark return. The
market factor is the most important benchmark and is selected by more than 50% of
all funds. The Betting-against-Beta factor is the second most selected factor and is
selected for more than 25% of all funds. The BAB factor is followed by the Carhart [15]
momentum factor and the Fama and French [32] size and value factors. Given a certain
benchmark return is selected a fund’s exposure is mostly positive. An exception is the
value factor where the number of funds having a significant negative exposure is nearly
equal to the number of funds having a positive exposure.
The results from this section broadly confirm the results from the previous section.
A large fraction of hedge funds load significantly on a long low beta assets and short
high beta assets portfolio and including such Betting-against-Beta (BAB) factors into
a benchmark model to decompose hedge fund returns has strong effects on hedge fund
risk-adjusted returns. Whereas the Fung and Hsieh [30] model suggests that the median
hedge fund delivered risk-adjusted performance of over 4% to its investor in the past, a
model augmented with a BAB factor decreases this number by more than 1% annually.
The results also suggest heterogeneity in the loading on beta arbitrage strategies proxied
by the BAB factor as not all hedge funds significantly load on the factor. In the next
section I examine whether this heterogeneity is able to explain differences in hedge fund
expected returns.
2.4.2.2 Beta Arbitrage and the cross-section of hedge fund returns
Do cross-sectional differences in the exposure to the beta-arbitrage strategy lead to
statistically and economically significant dispersion in excess returns after controlling
for exposure to other benchmark strategies? The Fung and Hsieh [30] factors have a
good explanatory power in the time-series, but dispersion in the exposure to the Fung
and Hsieh [30] factors does not create any statistically and economically meaningful
dispersion in the cross-section of hedge fund returns (Sadka [31], Bali et al. [42]). Hence,
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a significant explanatory of the BAB factor in the time-series does not necessarily imply
a significant explanatory in the cross-section.
To answer the question whether differences in the exposure to the BAB factor generates
differences in the cross-section of hedge fund returns I sort hedge funds into ten portfolios
according to their loading on the BAB factor and study the equally-weighted post-
ranking returns of the portfolios. Hedge fund factor betas can vary through time as a
function of macroeconomic state variable or fund specific characteristics (see Patton and
Ramodarai [40]). In order to take into account potential time-variation in factor loadings
I use rolling beta estimates. While rolling regressions capture time-variation in the factor
loadings they are also likely to be noisy due short estimation windows. Following the
previous section I report post-ranking returns for different estimation windows.
In January of each year beginning in 1999 I sort all hedge funds into 10 portfolios ac-
cording to their loading on the BAB factor. The loading on the BAB factor is computed
with a multivariate regression of a hedge fund’s monthly excess return on the Fung
and Hsieh [30] factors and the BAB factor using different estimation windows up to 60
months. Afterwards the funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios according
to their BAB loading. The post-formation returns of these portfolios during the next 12
month are linked across years to obtain for each portfolio a 10 year return time series.
The performance of these portfolios is then evaluated against the Fung and Hsieh [30]
seven factor model.
Table 6 suggests that variation in the loadings on the BAB factor leads to significant
dispersion in hedge fund returns. Portfolio 1 reports the risk-adjusted returns and factor
loadings of hedge funds with a low loading on the BAB factor, portfolio 10 for funds with
a very high loading on the BAB factor and the last column shows the spread between the
two extreme portfolios. Funds in portfolio 1 generated insignificant risk-adjusted returns
in the period from 1999 to 2008. In contrast funds in portfolio 10 have a high loading
on the BAB factor and with an average monthly alpha between 0.9% and 1% they
significantly outperformed the funds in portfolio 1. Besides a significant spread in the
alphas of these portfolios Table 6 also reports significant differences in the factor loadings
of these two portfolios. Funds in portfolio 1 have on average a significantly higher loading
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on the market factor. This suggests that these funds are not only investing in high beta
securities, but their bets are also more directional. Furthermore funds in portfolio 1 also
have higher loadings on the smb factor and the credit spread. Small cap securities have
higher betas and therefore a higher loading on the smb factor is intuitive. Frazzini and
Pedersen [25] show in their model that the BAB factor is sensitive to funding liquidity
shocks. Hence, when credit spreads are increasing funds with a high BAB exposure
experience lower returns.
The results stay economically as well as statistically the same when the required number
of observations required for inclusion is increased. Indeed, the results even become
stronger with the required number of observations. Exposure to beta arbitrage strategies
seem to be an important systematic driver of hedge fund performance and inclusion
of the BAB factor in a benchmark model can have a significant effect on hedge fund
performance rankings.
2.4.2.3 Robustness
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases due to the lack of regulation among
hedge funds. Inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary which results in a self
selection bias. In particular there is an incubation bias and a backfill bias. Funds often
rely on internal funding before they try to raise capital from outside investors. Funds
with successful track records list in a hedge fund databases while the unsuccessful funds
do not. This results in an incubation bias. On the other hand funds often backfill
their data, i.e. the database includes data prior to the listing date. These backfilled
returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. To control for these biases I
repeat the portfolio sorts dropping the first 12 return observations of every fund. Panel
A of Table 7 shows that this does not change the results. Risk-adjusted returns are
still increasing monotonically from the first to the tenth decile and the 10-1 spread is
statistically significant albeit economically smaller.
Besides backfilling their data hedge funds often hold illiquid securities or deliberately
smooth their returns which can lead to significant serial correlation of hedge fund returns.
To control for serial correlation I unsmooth hedge fund returns using the model of
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Getmansky et al. [51]. Similar to the effect of correcting for backfill and incubation bias
Panel B of Table 7 shows a decrease in the economic magnitude of the 10-1 spread. The
magnitude is however still economically meaningful and statistically significant.
The results reported in this paper could be due to the specific risk model used. Therefore,
I use different models to adjust hedge fund returns for exposures to risk. As mentioned
earlier Frazzini and Pedersen [25] point out the close relation between the BAB factor
and liquidity risk. The Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model includes the change in
the credit spread, a measure for funding liquidity conditions. Hence in the portfolio
sorts the paper already controls for exposure to funding liquidity risk. There is however
no control for market liquidity risk. To control for market liquidity risk I repeat the
portfolio sorts and augment the seven factor model with the traded market liquidity risk
factor by Pastor and Stambaugh [33]. Panel C of Table 7 suggests that exposure to the
liquidity risk factor does not explain the spread in risk-adjusted return between the first
and the tenth portfolio. Finally, Panel D of Table 7 presents results using the Fama
and French [32] model augmented with the Carhart [15] momentum factor. Again, the
results stay economically meaningful and statistically significant.
2.4.3 A close look at long-short equity funds
In this section I take a close look at long/short equity funds. First, long/short equity
funds are the most important hedge fund style with roughly 40% of funds falling into
this style category. Second, many long/short equity funds have to file regularly with the
SEC. This gives me the opportunity to have a snapshot on their holdings and allows me
to test theories explaining the low-beta anomaly.
2.4.3.1 Beta Arbitrage and the performance of long/short equity funds
I repeat the analysis from Table 6 keeping only long/short equity funds. I focus on the
results using a 36 month estimation period for the pre-ranking betas. The results in
Panel A of Table 8 suggest that dispersion in the loading on the BAB factor leads to a
stronger dispersion in returns for long/short equity funds than for the whole universe of
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funds. Funds with a high loading on the BAB factor outperform funds with a low loading
by 1.2% monthly between 1999 and 2008. Correcting for potential biases in hedge fund
databases and using different models for the risk-adjustement does not change these
conclusions as shown in Panels B to D of Table 8 . Using the Fama and French [32]
three factor model augmented with the Carhart [15] momentum factor leads however to a
significant decrease in the 10-1 spread. Franzoni [48] empirically analyses the time-series
evolution of the market exposure of value stocks and documents a steady decrease since
around 1940. Hence, some fraction of the dispersion in risk-adjusted returns between the
first and tenth portfolio can be attributed to dispersion in the value factor. Unreported
results show that funds in the first decile indeed load significantly negative on the value
factor whereas funds in the 10th decile load significantly positive on the value factor.
Exposure to the value factor is however not able to explain the 10-1 spread completely.
The spread stays statistically and economically significant.
2.4.3.2 Do hedge funds hold low beta securities?
In the previous analysis I assume the loading on the BAB factor is a valid proxy for
the systematic risk of the securities a hedge fund holds. In this section I provide direct
evidence for this conjecture using mandatory hedge fund disclosures from the 13F filings.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the market beta of hedge fund long equity hold-
ings. The mean and median are around 1.1. Contrary to the results from the factor
model regression this implies that hedge funds are actually buying more market risk
than other market participants. Frazzini and Pedersen [25] for example report a mean
market beta for mutual funds of 1.06. Hedge funds tilt their portfolios stronger towards
small cap securities which are usually more sensitive to aggregate market movements.
Hence, the higher market beta in the aggregate is not surprising.
What drives then the high BAB exposure in the factor model regressions? One expla-
nations could come from the short side. While hedge funds are maybe not long low
beta securities, they are short high beta securities. Data on short positions of individual
hedge funds is not available. However, one can analyze short interest data reported
by the exchanges and make the assumption that short selling transactions are mainly
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driven by hedge fund trading. Supporting evidence for this simplifying assumption can
be found in Ben-David et al. [34]. Figure 3 plots the value weighted beta of hedge fund
long equity holdings and the value weighted beta of short interest. The beta of short
positions is significantly higher than the beta of long positions. Specifically, the mean
beta of short positions is 1.21 compared to 1.13 for the long holdings and the difference
is statistically different from zero (the t-statistic is 7.3). Thus, on an aggregate level the
significant loading on the BAB factor seems to be due to the short side, i.e. hedge funds
are shorting high beta securities.
Next, I take a look into the cross-section. If variation in the exposure to the BAB expo-
sure is solely driven by the short side I do not expect to see any differences in the long
side across beta sorted hedge funds. In Table 9 I use the portfolio assignments from the
previous section (where the results are reported in Table 8) and compare funds’ portfolio
betas in the different deciles. The betas are monotonically declining from the first to
the tenth portfolio and the difference in betas is highly statistically significant. Thus,
hedge funds with a higher factor loading on the BAB factor seem to invest in stocks
with lower betas.
2.4.3.3 Which hedge funds hold low beta securities?
Frazzini and Pedersen [25] suggest that more risk averse investors and investors having
a better access to leverage tilt their portfolio stronger towards low beta securities. In
particular they show theoretically that the tangency portfolio in a borrowing restricted
CAPM has a beta smaller than one. In this section I explore the effects of risk aversion
and access to leverage on the beta of the long side of my sample of hedge funds.
I start with the effects of leverage. In Table 10 column 1 I regress a hedge fund’s
unlevered long-side portfolio beta on a dummy variable equal to one if the fund uses
leverage. The coefficient is negative and significant. This result is consistent with the
theory that funds having access to leverage are tilting their portfolio weights stronger
towards low beta assets. The coefficient of -0.03 is economically however small which can
have different reasons. First, I use a dummy variable for leverage. The cross-sectional
variation among hedge fund leverage can be large with higher leverage funds stronger
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tilting towards low beta assets. Using the dummy variable approach only captures the
mean change in long-side portfolio beta for all funds using leverage. In unreported
results I use a fund’s average leverage during its existence as independent variable. The
results stay nearly unchanged and I stick to the leverage dummy in the rest of the
paper. Second, leverage can be correlated with risk aversion. In a CAPM world the
observation of an investor using more leverage is an indicator of a lower risk aversion.
Leverage therefore is only a raw proxy for access to funding liquidity as it does not
measure potential leverage but rather realized leverage. Overall, using reported leverage
by hedge funds probably understates the correlation between access to funding liquidity
and long-side beta.
Whether a borrowing constraint binds depends not only on access to leverage, but also
on an agent’s risk aversion. For any given level of potential leverage, the borrowing
constraint is more likely to bind for the less risk averse investor. To study the effect of
risk aversion on hedge fund’s long-side beta I draw from a large literature suggesting
different variables that have an effect on the effective risk aversion. Goetzmann et al. [35]
and Panageas and Westerfield [37] show that incentive fees encourage risk taking, i.e.
they decrease the risk aversion. The results in Table 10 column 2 show that the incentive
fee has a positive impact on the preference for beta. While incentive fees decrease risk
aversion, a high-water mark provision or personal capital invested can increase risk
aversion. When a fund manager for example has personal capital invested in the fund
he participates in the gains and losses of the fund symmetrically which makes him more
risk averse. Column 3 of Table 10 shows that the presence of a personal capital stake as
well as a high-water mark provision has a significant and negative impact on the beta
of the long holdings. Another channel which can potentially influence the risk aversion
is the flow performance relationship. Ding et al. [52] show that the flow performance
relationship of hedge funds is convex in the absence of share restrictions and concave in
the case of share restrictions. Hence in the absence of share restrictions hedge funds have
a stronger incentive to take on higher risks in order to attract more flows. In column 4
of Table 10 I therefore add the lock-up periods as well as the redemption notice period
to the model. The results suggest that stronger share restrictions i.e. longer lock-up
period as well as longer redemption notice periods lead to a lower demand for beta.
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Finally, in the last column I add macroeconomic variables to the regression. In particular
I add the VIX index as a proxy of aggregate risk aversion and the TED spread as a proxy
for funding liquidity. When risk aversion as proxied by the VIX index is increasing, hedge
funds are moving from high beta to low beta securities. To the contrary, when the TED
spread is increasing hedge funds are moving towards high beta securities. Overall the
results in this section are broadly in line with the model of Frazzini and Pedersen [25].
2.4.3.4 Hedge fund characteristics and stock preferences
For completeness, this section studies which factors drive hedge funds’ demand for other
stock characteristics. This is important to rule out other explanations for my results. I
therefore use the last specification from Table 10 and use as the dependent variable other
stock characteristics. In particular, I focus on total volatility, the book-to-market ratio
and momentum. For every hedge fund I thereby compute the value-weighted average of
these characteristics using the reported long-equity holdings.
Column 1 of Table 11 shows for comparison again the results when the portfolio beta
is the dependent variable. In column 2 of Table 11 I use total volatility instead. It is
notoriously hard to disentangle systematic volatility from idiosyncratic volatility. Often
stocks with high systematic volatility also have high idiosyncratic volatility. It is how-
ever interesting to observe that leverage does not have a significant effect on a hedge
fund’s preference for total volatility of a stock. One can argue that the negative effect
of leverage on the preference for beta is due to e.g. portfolio margining. Until 2007
margin requirements were computed on a stock-by-stock basis and since 2007 portfolio
margining was introduced where required margins are based on the value at risk of the
total portfolio. At least before before 2007 to minimize the required margin and lever up
as much as possible a hedge fund should choose therefore stocks with low total volatil-
ity. According to this argument the relation between leverage and total volatility should
be stronger than the relation between beta and leverage. Table 11 however suggests a
weaker relation between leverage and total volatility.
Column 3 of Table 11 uses the book-to-market ratio as the dependent variable. The
paper already pointed out, that there is a high correlation between value investing and
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low beta investing due to the steady decrease in the systematic risk of value stocks
documented by Franzoni [48]. Are hedge funds with a strong value tilt also hedge funds
with a low beta tilt? Column 3 of Table 11 suggests that there are differences. A hedge
fund’s value tilt does not depend on its use of leverage and the value tilt increases with
the incentive fee whereas the low beta tilt decreases with the incentive fee. Thus, hedge
funds with a low beta tilt are not necessary value investors.
The last column of Table 11 shows results with momentum as the dependent variable.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper documents that a factor capturing the return from beta-arbitrage strategies
has significant explanatory power in the time-series and cross section of hedge fund
returns. It studies furthermore how the exposure towards this factor is related to the
contractual agreements between hedge fund managers and investors.
The results of this paper have several implications. First, they provide empirical support
for the model of Frazzini and Pedersen [25]. Second, the results suggest that some of
the high risk-adjusted returns in the hedge fund industry reported in earlier studies
can be attributed to strategies exploiting the low-beta anomaly. Third, the results are
important from an asset allocation perspective. As some hedge funds have a strong tilt
towards low beta assets, investments into these funds can help institutional investors to
achieve exposure to the attractive risk return trade-off of these assets.
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Table 2.2: Hedge Funds’ Holdings Data
This table shows summary statistics for the Long-Equity Holdings for 125 Long/Short
Equity Hedge Funds obtained through a merge between the TASS database and SEC
13F filings. All statistics are estimated by pooling time-series and cross-sectional ob-
servations.
Mean 25th Pct. Median 75 Pct. Std.Dev.
Market beta 1.11 1 1.1 1.22 0.2
Asset under Management (TASS) 564 100 250 630 958
Size of Equity Portfolio (13F) 477 75 190 440 867
Incentive Fee 19.61 20 20 20 2
Management Fee 1.3 1 1.2 1.5 0.32
Lockup Period 6.7 0 6 12 6.5
Redemption notice period 40 30 30 45 15.3
Leverage 0.35 0 0 1 0.47
High-Water Mark 0.81 1 1 1 0.38
Personal Capital 0.41 0 0 1 0.48
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Table 2.3: Risk Factors
This table shows summary statistics for the different risk factor in % per month. The
first factor is the Betting-against-beta factor of Frazzini and Pedersen [25]. The other
factors are the excess return on the market (MKTRF),the small minus big factor (SMB);
the excess returns on portfolios of lookback straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX),
commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), the change in the constant matu-
rity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond over the 3-month T-bill (BD10RET),
the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond over the 10-year Treasury
bond(BAAMTSY), the value factor (HML) of Fama and French [32], the Carhart [15]
momentum factor (UMD), the Pastor and Stambaugh [33] liquidity risk factor and
leverage mimicking factor (LMP) of Adrian et al. [45].
Mean Median Stdev Max Min
BAB 0.43 0.49 1.24 4.11 -3.01
MKTRF 0.31 1.01 4.48 8.18 -18.54
SMB 0.16 -0.17 3.78 21.99 -16.85
BAAMTSY 0.02 -0.00 0.18 1.45 -0.25
BD10RET -0.02 -0.04 0.24 0.68 -1.18
PTFSFX 0.85 -2.82 19.91 90.27 -30.13
PTFSCOM 0.20 -2.51 14.03 64.75 -23.04
PTFSBD -0.80 -3.70 14.89 68.86 -25.36
HML 0.33 0.32 3.42 13.87 -12.37
UMD 0.87 0.77 5.06 18.35 -25.04
PS 0.74 0.51 3.54 10.98 -10.00
LMP 0.88 0.86 3.61 14.18 -18.57
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Table 2.7: Robustness
At the beginning of each year hedge funds are sorted into ten equally weighted portfolios
according to their loading on the BAB factor. The factor beta is calculated using a
regression of hedge fund excess returns on the Fung and Hsieh [30] seven factor model
and the BAB factor, using different minimum numbers of observations prior to portfolio
formation. Portfolio returns begin in 1999 and end in December 2008. Columns 1 to
10 report alpha per month (in %). The seven factors are the S&P 500 return minus
risk free rate (MKTRF), the small minus big factor of Fama and French [32] (SMB),
change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S.10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the
duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody’s BAA bond
over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond
PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM),
where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. Column 11 report the same statistics
for the 10-1 spread. t-statistics are in parentheses
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
Panel A: Controlling for Incubation and Backfill Bias
Alpha 0.263 0.272 0.171 0.209 0.206 0.269 0.313 0.435 0.563 0.754 0.491
(1.445) (2.188) (1.652) (2.410) (2.840) (2.875) (3.324) (3.879) (4.048) (3.375) (2.265)
Panel B: Controlling for Return Smoothing
Alpha 0.287 0.288 0.051 0.274 0.272 0.266 0.335 0.545 0.561 0.765 0.478
(1.609) (2.517) (0.534) (3.573) (3.236) (3.142) (3.690) (4.699) (4.057) (3.346) (2.111)
Panel C: Risk Adjustment with FH7 plus liquidity risk factor
Alpha 0.226 0.262 0.165 0.192 0.209 0.226 0.218 0.372 0.340 0.607 0.381
(1.498) (2.122) (1.715) (2.051) (2.340) (2.370) (2.056) (3.286) (2.537) (3.054) (2.316)
Panel D: Risk Adjustment with Fama and French 4 factor model
Alpha 0.201 0.248 0.123 0.112 0.137 0.161 0.178 0.296 0.272 0.549 0.348
(1.490) (2.246) (1.383) (1.286) (1.504) (1.754) (1.777) (2.723) (2.079) (2.831) (1.981)
Chapter 2. Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns 70
Table 2.8: Long/short equity funds
At the beginning of each year long/short equity funds are sorted into ten equally
weighted portfolios according to their loading on the BAB factor. The factor beta
is calculated using a regression of hedge fund excess returns on the Fung and Hsieh
[30] seven factor model and the BAB factor. Portfolio returns begin in 1999 and end in
December 2008. Columns 1 to 10 report the alpha per month (in %). The seven factors
are the S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (MKTRF), the small minus big factor of
Fama and French [32] (SMB), change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S.10-year
Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in
the spread of Moody’s BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted
for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and
commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy.
Column 11 report the same statistics for the 10-1 spread. t-statistics are in parentheses
Portfolio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10-1
Panel A: Baseline Results
Alpha -0.084 0.119 0.296 0.236 0.126 0.315 0.225 0.552 0.565 1.171 1.255
(-0.354) (0.592) (2.026) (2.241) (1.103) (2.896) (1.867) (4.276) (3.485) (4.441) (3.365)
Panel B: Adjusted for Backfill Bias
Alpha -0.030 0.093 0.140 0.273 0.238 0.149 0.312 0.487 0.807 0.974 1.003
(-0.125) (0.470) (0.912) (2.080) (2.229) (1.205) (3.087) (3.569) (4.940) (3.754) (2.734)
Panel C: Adjusted for Return Smoothing
Alpha 0.093 0.180 0.229 0.058 0.298 0.220 0.399 0.468 0.672 1.007 0.913
(0.388) (0.907) (1.627) (0.538) (2.770) (2.153) (3.419) (3.395) (4.475) (3.855) (2.522)
Panel D: Fama and French
Alpha -0.084 0.303 0.375 0.304 0.113 0.283 0.112 0.414 0.346 0.776 0.659
(-0.354) (1.753) (2.873) (3.010) (1.048) (2.618) (0.966) (3.275) (2.459) (2.996) (2.134)
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Table 2.9: Do hedge funds hold low beta securities?
This table displays the summary statistics for market betas of the long equity holdings
of funds in the different BAB factor sorted portfolios from Table 8. The sample is
restricted to Long/Short Equity funds filing a SEC 13F report.
Portfolio Average Beta 25th Pct. Median 75th Pct.
1 1.26 1.05 1.23 1.43
2 1.22 1.06 1.19 1.34
3 1.22 1.03 1.14 1.36
4 1.16 1.02 1.14 1.26
5 1.19 1.07 1.16 1.32
6 1.18 1.01 1.14 1.31
7 1.10 0.99 1.10 1.20
8 1.09 0.96 1.06 1.25
9 1.09 0.92 1.08 1.23
10 1.09 0.78 1.03 1.22
10-1 0.17
(8.72)
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Table 2.10: Which funds hold low beta stocks
Regressions of hedge fund portfolio beta on fund characteristics. Portfolio beta is
the value weighted average of the individual stock betas in a hedge fund portfolio.
Individual stock betas are computed with daily data using the previous twelve month
of data. The independent variables are a dummy for the use of leverage, the incentive
fee in %, the management fee in %, a high-water mark dummy, a personal capital
dummy, redemption notice period in days, the lock-up period in month, the VIX index
and TED spread.T-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* denotes significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Leverage -0.0307*** -0.0383*** -0.0371*** -0.0429*** -0.0410*** -0.0412***
(-4.698) (-6.090) (-5.865) (-6.904) (-6.775) (-6.877)
Incentive fee 0.0111*** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 0.0118*** 0.0109***
(5.949) (5.661) (5.984) (6.204) (5.751)
Management fee 0.0293*** 0.0217* 0.0350*** 0.0312*** 0.0315***
(2.959) (2.021) (3.393) (3.162) (3.217)
High-water mark -0.0393*** -0.0299*** -0.0300*** -0.0315***
(-4.692) (-3.518) (-3.657) (-3.860)
Personal capital -0.0205** -0.0207** -0.0167* -0.0163*
(-2.294) (-2.406) (-1.912) (-1.848)
Redemption notice period -0.0217** -0.0164* -0.0233**
(-2.532) (-1.876) (-2.577)
Lockup period -0.0785*** -0.0720*** -0.0733***
(-5.357) (-4.951) (-5.042)
Size 0.0111*** 0.00781**
(3.672) (2.706)
TED 0.000425***
(4.295)
VIX -0.00459***
(-5.697)
Constant 1.127*** 0.873*** 0.934*** 0.918*** 0.689*** 0.855***
(137.3) (18.35) (17.83) (18.46) (7.113) (9.174)
Observations 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
R-squared 0.006 0.022 0.029 0.045 0.051 0.087
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Table 2.11: Hedge Funds and other stock characteristics
Regressions of different hedge fund portfolio characteristics on fund characteristics.
The independent variables are a dummy for the use of leverage, the incentive fee in
%, the management fee in %, a high-water mark dummy, a personal capital dummy,
redemption notice period in days, the lock-up period in month, the VIX index and
TED spread. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***,**,* denotes significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively.
Beta Volatility Book-to-Market Momentum
Leverage -0.0412*** -0.000700 -0.00644 0.0484**
(-6.877) (-0.439) (-0.821) (2.323)
Incentive fee 0.0109*** 0.000806** 0.00392*** -0.00449
(5.751) (2.090) (3.910) (-1.286)
Management fee 0.0315*** 0.0163*** -0.0185* 0.0756**
(3.217) (10.78) (-1.757) (2.155)
High-water mark -0.0315*** -0.0119*** 0.0452*** -0.143***
(-3.860) (-5.244) (3.515) (-4.415)
Personal capital -0.0163* -0.00172 0.0313*** -0.0262
(-1.848) (-0.958) (4.889) (-1.286)
Redemption notice period -0.0233** -0.00327* 0.0609*** -0.0632***
(-2.577) (-1.926) (5.581) (-3.051)
Lockup period -0.0733*** -0.0130*** 0.115*** -0.0377
(-5.042) (-4.932) (4.305) (-1.266)
Size 0.00781** 0.000437 -0.0167*** 0.0210*
(2.706) (0.625) (-4.134) (1.762)
VIX -0.00459*** 0.00248*** 0.00720*** -0.00891*
(-5.697) (4.952) (4.138) (-1.867)
TED 0.000425*** -0.000369*** -0.000194 4.72e-05
(4.295) (-6.752) (-0.707) (0.0593)
Constant 0.855*** 0.0570*** 0.519*** 0.256
(9.174) (2.901) (6.179) (0.931)
Observations 1,678 1,678 1,678 1,678
R-squared 0.087 0.235 0.142 0.044
Chapter 2. Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns 74
Figure 2.1: Factor Selection on the Style Level
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This figure plots the average excess return of each investment style and the economic
contribution of exposure to a beta arbitrage strategy to the average excess return. In a
first step a stepwise regression procedure is used to extract the dominant benchmarks
for each investment style from 12 available benchmark returns. The benchmark returns
are the S&P 500 return minus the risk free rate, the small minus big and high-minus-
low factors of Fama and French [32], the Pastor and Stambaugh [33] traded liquidity
risk factor, the Carhart [15] momentum factor, leverage mimicking portfolio of Adrian
et al. [45], the change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S.10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond, change in the spread of Moody’s BAA
bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration, bond PTFS,
currency PTFS , and commodities PTFS, where PTFS is primitive trend following
strategy. The styles are Convertible Arbitrage (CA), Dedicated Short Bias (DSB),
Emerging Markets (EM), Equity Market Neutral (EMN), Event Driven (ED), Fixed
Income Arbitrage (FIA), Fund of Funds (FoF), Global Macro (GM), Long/Short Equity
(LSE), Managed Futures (MF) and Multi Strategy (MS).
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Figure 2.2: Factor Selection on the Individual Fund Level
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This figure shows the five most often selected benchmark returns and the fraction of
funds choosing them. For every hedge fund with a history of at least 36 month a
stepwise regression is performed using 12 benchmark returns. The benchmark returns
are the S&P 500 return minus the risk free rate, the small minus big and high-minus-low
factors of Fama and French [32], the Pastor and Stambaugh [33] traded liquidity risk
factor, the Carhart [15] momentum factor, the leverage mimicking portfolio of Adrian
et al. [45], the change in the constant maturity yield of the U.S.10-year Treasury bond
adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond, change in the spread of Moody’s BAA
bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration, bond PTFS,
currency PTFS , and commodities PTFS, where PTFS is primitive trend following
strategy.
Chapter 2. Beta Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Returns 76
Figure 2.3: Hedge Fund Long Equity Beta
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This figure plots the value weighted beta of hedge fund long equity holdings and the
value weighted beta of outstanding short interest from January 1999 to December 2008.
Chapter 3
Behavioral Factors in Risk
Arbitrage
3.1 Introduction
Merger arbitrage strategies are investments in stocks of companies involved in a merger
or acquisition (M&A). After the announcement of a takeover, the target stock usually
trades at a discount to the price offered by the acquirer. A merger arbitrage strategy
takes a long position in the target stock to eventually capture the spread between the
current market price and the offer price in the event of deal completion. While the
success probability of announced takeovers is very high, deals can and regularly do fail.
Due to this deal completion risk, merger arbitrage is also known as risk arbitrage.1
Risk arbitrage is profitable. Mitchell and Pulvino [53] as well as Baker and Savasoglu [54]
document significant risk-adjusted returns in risk arbitrage and postulate that the abnor-
mal returns are compensation for providing liquidity to exiting shareholders. Assuming
demand curves for stocks are not perfectly elastic, i.e. there are limits to arbitrage,
selling pressure by target shareholders pushes prices below their fundamental value and
generates a profitable trading opportunity for investors willing and able to provide liq-
uidity. So far, the literature however lacks a full and satisfactory explanation for the
1In the rest of the paper the terms risk arbitrage and merger arbitrage are used interchangeably.
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liquidity demand of target shareholders after the takeover announcement.2 Therefore,
our understanding of the profitability of merger arbitrage is incomplete.
Drawing on the literature of psychological anchors (Tversky and Kahneman [56]) and
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky [57]), Baker et al. [58] provide significant
empirical evidence for the importance of behavioral biases in the takeover market. In
particular, they document a clustering of offer prices in takeovers around recent peak
prices and they find a jump in the success probability of a takeover for offer prices only
slightly exceeding the target stock’s 52-week high.3 Besides the aforementioned results,
the work of Baker et al. [58] also shows a promising direction to look for an explanation
of merger arbitrage profitability.
The idea is the following: Investors prone to behavioral biases sell the target stock
when the offer price is above the 52-week and their liquidity demand is absorbed by
risk arbitrageurs. This, by the way, leads to a higher fraction of risk arbitrageurs in
the shareholder base. As risk arbitrageurs are more likely to accept a takeover offer,
their presence increases the success probability of a takeover (Cornelli and Li [59], Hsieh
and Walkling [60]). Risk arbitrageurs are however also risk averse and have a limited
amount of capital. Thus, to provide liquidity to the selling shareholders, they require a
compensation even for idiosyncratic risk (Baker and Savasoglu [54]). Drawing on this
idea, a large portion of the abnormal returns in merger arbitrage should be concentrated
in takeover deals with offer prices above the target stock’s 52-week high.
Note that the results of Baker et al. [58] do not imply this explanation for merger arbi-
trage profits. On the one hand, they do not examine the trading behavior of investors.
This means that it is unclear whether offer prices above the 52-week high trigger any
selling pressure. The higher deal success probability for offer prices above the target
stock’s 52-week high can also be consistent with channels different from the aforemen-
tioned one. On the other hand, their results could even predict the opposite. A higher
success probability decreases the risk of a takeover deal and therefore, risk arbitrageurs
2Direct empirical evidence exploring the determinants of investor exit around takeover announcements
is scarce. Using institutional trade-level data, Jegadeesh and Tang [55] suggest that one important motive
to trade, portfolio rebalancing, cannot explain the investor exit after takeover announcements.
3Although the authors stress that the 52-week is not the magic number and there are other peak
prices with incremental importance in merger negotiations, they provide significant empirical evidence
highlighting the role of this specific price level.
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require a lower compensation to absorb the shares of selling shareholders. Hence, it is
an open empirical question whether the behavioral bias identified by Baker et al. [58]
also offers an explanation for the profitability of merger arbitrage.
This paper empirically tests this explanation. First, I ask whether offer prices above the
52-week high trigger selling pressure by investors. To do so, I use institutional trading
data provided by Ancerno. Most behavioral effects are empirically examined using data
on individual investor trading (for example Odean [61]).4 The rising amount of equity
held by institutional investors makes an understanding of this group’s trading behavior
however increasingly important.
I find that institutional investors are selling on average 50% more of the target stock at
the announcement date if the offer price exceeds the target stock’s 52-week high. While
slightly lower in magnitude, this effect also prevails in the days after the announcement
day. The economic magnitude of the effect is even stronger when I use the more robust
median. Using the median, institutional investor exit from the target for offer prices
above the 52-week high exceeds institutional investor exit for offer prices below the
52-week high by more than 100% at the announcement date. The effect statistically
and economically survives after controlling for the offer premium, the size of the target,
acquirer characteristics, other deal characteristics and time fixed effects.
Second, I test whether offer prices exceeding the 52-week high predict higher returns in
a sample of over 7000 takeover deals in the US and across 23 developed countries in the
period from 1985 to 2012. At the beginning of each month I sort all takeover deals into
three portfolio depending on the distance between the offer price and the target stock’s
52 week high (∆52). A trading strategy investing in takeover deals in the highest tercile
generates annual abnormal returns of 7.4% in the period between 1985 and 2012. To
the contrary, a trading strategy investing in takeover deals in the lowest tercile does not
generate any abnormal returns. Thus, consistent with the proposed explanation, risk
arbitrage profits are fully concentrated in takeovers with offer prices above the 52-week
high.
4One of the exceptions is Frazzini [62]
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I rule out several other explanations of my results. I find that my results survive when I
use different asset pricing models to compute risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, I show
that other variables, correlated with ∆52, are not driving out the results. Specifically,
neither the offer premium, an important predictor of risk arbitrage returns proposed by
Baker and Savasoglu [54], nor the disposition effect can explain my results.
Having established a robust unconditional relation between risk arbitrage returns and
offer prices above the 52-week high, I study their conditional relation. In particular,
I analyze whether the return predictive power of ∆52 varies systematically with the
supply of arbitrage capital.
To proxy for the amount of available arbitrage capital, I build on the following idea: It
is a well-known fact that mergers and acquisitions occur in cycles (see e.g. Shleifer and
Vishny [63]). If capital is slowly moving into and out of merger arbitrage funds, there
will be an oversupply of arbitrage capital at times of low deal activity growth and an
undersupply of arbitrage capital at times of high deal activity growth.5 Using the growth
in takeover activity as a proxy for the supply of arbitrage capital, I find the predictive
power of ∆52 to be significantly higher at times when arbitrage capital is scarce.
I provide several additional results in the paper. First, I investigate the role of transac-
tion costs. I compute risk arbitrage returns adjusted for costs arising through the bid-ask
spread using the estimator of Corwin and Schultz [65] and I estimate trading cost func-
tions from trade level data following Keim and Madhavan [66] and Moskowitz et al. [67].
I find that trading costs for takeover targets are low and risk-arbitrage strategies based
on ∆52 exhibit significant scalability.6
Second, I study the investment value of the variable ∆52 in a portfolio setting using the
parametric portfolio policy approach proposed by Brandt et al. [68]. Brandt et al. [68]
estimate optimal portfolio weights as functions of asset characteristics. The approach
of Brandt et al. [68] allows me to evaluate the economic importance of the 52-week
5Such a mechanism can be motivated for example with the work of Pastor and Stambaugh [64]. In
their model investors slowly learn and update their beliefs about the returns from active management.
Due to this slow updating of beliefs investor capital does not react sufficiently as a response to a changing
investment opportunity set.
6They decrease by around 50% in the post-announcement period compared to the pre-announcement
period
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high from the perspective of a risk arbitrageur after controlling for several other return
predictors in takeovers. Assuming an investor with constant relative risk aversion γ = 4
and imposing a no-short sale constraint, I estimate significant utility gains in- and out-
of sample when the investor incorporates the difference between the offer price and the
target stock ’s 52-week high in his portfolio decision. Furthermore, other variables and
transaction costs are not driving out the effect.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it complements the results
of Baker et al. [58]. One can argue the effect of the 52-week high on merger pricing
and merger outcomes are mainly due to its impact on small investors where behavioral
biases are more present. Indeed, Baker et al. [58] provide evidence suggesting that in
the more recent half of their sample, where the amount of equity held by institutional
investors already increased significantly, offer prices seem to be somewhat less influenced
by the 52-week high. My evidence however suggests that the 52-week high also affects
institutional investors. Thus, the results of Baker et al. [58] may not only be important
in their sample period, but also going forward. Additionally, the paper provides results
concerning the impact of offer prices exceeding the 52-week high on another aspect of
the takeover market, risk arbitrage profits. As pointed out earlier, the impact on risk
arbitrage profits is ex ante not clear.
Second, the paper contributes to the growing literature documenting significant shifts
in asset supply or demand around a stock’s 52-week high. George and Hwang [69] find
that a stock’s nearness to its 52-week high explains most of the returns to momentum
investing and Heath et al. [70] find a doubling of employee option exercise when a stock
exceeds its 52-week high. Two contemporaneous papers by Birru [71] and George et al.
[72] study the relation between a stock’s 52-week high and the earnings announcement
drift. Both studies find a significant earnings announcement drift only for stocks trading
near their 52-week highs and interpret this result as evidence for psychological anchoring.
Third, to the best of my knowledge this is the first paper to study returns in risk
arbitrage using an international sample of takeovers. Most studies on risk arbitrage
returns focus on the US market (e.g. Mitchell and Pulvino [53], Baker and Savasoglu
[54]) or study another market in isolation. Most risk arbitrage funds however invest
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globally. Studying risk arbitrage using a global sample therefore provides better insights
into the performance of this alternative investment strategy.
Fourth, the paper provides transaction cost estimates for trading takeover targets and
analyzes the scalability of risk arbitrage strategies. In their seminal paper Mitchell
and Pulvino [53] use transaction cost estimates provided by Breen et al. [73]. They
note however, that trading costs can be different during merger situations. This paper
empirically shows that the trading costs of merger stocks are indeed very different.
Fifth, the paper investigates the usefulness of the Brandt et al. [68] parametric portfolio
policy approach for event-driven investment strategies.7
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews theory which
motivates the relation between a stock’s 52-week high, trading decisions and asset prices.
Section 2 describes the data sources, section 3 studies investors’ trading behavior around
takeover announcements, section 4 studies the impact of recent peak prices on risk
arbitrage returns, section 5 provides additional results and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background and Motivation
The 52-week high is a salient price level. It is mostly irrelevant, but highly visible as it is
usually reported in the finance section of every major newspaper (for example the Wall
Street Journal). Experimental evidence of Tversky and Kahneman [56] suggests that
such salient and often irrelevant information can have a major influence when individuals
have to perform complex tasks like estimating a quantity. Specifically, according to
Tversky and Kahneman [56] individuals often anchor on salient information. In the case
of stocks, investors may use as an initial estimate for the fair price the 52-week high and
afterwards they incorporate other information into their estimate. The final estimate
usually does not deviate too much from the initial value however. Hence, individuals
seem to anchor on the initial value.
7The Brandt et al. [68] approach has already been applied in Plazzi et al. [74] for real estate portfolios,
in Ghysels et al. [75] for international asset allocation and in Barroso and Santa-Clara [76] for currency
investments. The results of all these studies suggest that the Brandt et al. [68] approach is robust,
delivers good out of sample results and is often superior to traditional portfolio optimization methods
despite potential model mis-specifications.
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How does this impact the trading decisions of investors around a takeover announce-
ment? Takeover announcements are good news for target shareholders and the stock
price increase due to the takeover announcements usually grabs investor attention. Ac-
cording to Ben-David and Hirshleifer [77] this can lead many investors to re-examine
their positions and trade depending on their beliefs concerning the stock. An offer price
significantly exceeding the 52-week high pushes the market price of the stock above
the 52-week high and when investors anchor on the 52-week high, they may sell their
positions in the target stock as (1) they believe the investment has run its course, (2)
they do not expect high returns going forward as the offered price is already above the
estimated fair value and hence, higher offers are unlikely.
A different explanation for observing increased liquidity demand around the 52-week
high is based not on beliefs, but on values. Prospect theory proposed by Kahneman and
Tversky [57] provides an alternative theory of decision making under risk to the stan-
dard expected utility theory. Importantly, prospect theory assumes individuals evaluate
outcomes relative to a reference point, they have a greater aversion to losses than they
appreciate gains and their sensitivity to changes in an outcome decreases the further
away the outcome moves away from the reference point. These assumptions imply a
utility function which is concave in the region of gains and convex in the region of losses.
The reference point in prospect theory is not well defined and can be the status quo, an
expectation or an aspirational level. In finance, empirical evidence (Heath et al. [70])
as well as experimental evidence (Gneezy [78]) however suggests a stock’s 52-week high
is one important reference point. Thus, when the stock price moves above the 52-week
high investors are pushed into the concave region of their utility function, which increases
their risk aversion and their propensity to sell.
Finally, recent work by Barberis and Xiong [79] provide a third motivation for observing
an increased liquidity demand for offer prices exceeding the 52-week high. Barberis and
Xiong [80] examine theoretically the ability of prospect theory to predict the disposition
effect (see Shefrin and Statman [81]) and raise doubts. Empirically, individual stock
returns are positively skewed whereas market returns are negatively skewed (see e.g.
Hong and Stein [82]). In particular with a positively skewed return distribution, prospect
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theory, according to Barberis and Xiong [80], often predicts the opposite of a disposition
effect. In Barberis and Xiong [79] the authors therefore propose a new theory based
on the realization utility hypothesis. According to this hypothesis made by Shefrin and
Statman [81] investors experience a direct utility (disutility) from realizing gains (losses).
Assuming a sufficiently high discount rate, investors with realization utility preferences
exhibit a disposition effect. Furthermore, the model of Barberis and Xiong [79] predicts
increased selling intensity around a stock’s 52-week high.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Data on Mergers and Acquisitions
I use data on mergers and acquisitions from the Thomson SDC database between 1985
and 2012. The SDC database covers mergers and acquisitions around the world. In this
paper I restrict the sample to a set of 23 developed countries. Specifically, I use data
from the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
For my final sample I apply the following filters to the dataset:
• In the US I only keep deals where I am able match the cusip of the target provided
by SDC with the CRSP daily tapes. For all other countries I require a valid match
between a target’s cusip (Canada), sedol (rest of the world) or name with the
Compustat Global Security Daily files. For equity financed deals I furthermore
require a valid match between the acquirer’s cusip, sedol or name and CRSP or
Compustat.
• A deal has to be pure cash or pure stock financed. For stock financed deals I
require a valid exchange ratio from SDC. In case of missing exchange ratios I
checked manually whether the exchange ratio is stated in the SDC deal synopsis.
• Although I checked the match between SDC and the different databases manually,
there are some unreasonable matches. Several deals report negative bid premia,
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initial arbitrage spreads of more than 100% or smaller than -20%. I delete these
observations from the sample.
• Merger Arbitrage is a mid to small cap strategy. I delete however deals with a value
of less than USD 10 million to guarantee that my results are not contaminated by
extremely illiquid securities.
After applying the aforementioned filters I have a sample of 7740 takeover transactions.
With 4888 transactions most of the deals in my sample take place in the US. This is
however mainly due to the overrepresentation of US deals in the early part of the sample.
Takeover transactions outside of the United States became increasingly important in the
more recent period. The top graph of Figure 1 shows the number of deals and the bottom
graph of Figure 1 the volume of deals for the US sample and the international sample
excluding the US. Until 2005 over 50% of all deals as well as 50% of all deal volume
occurred inside the United States. Afterwards the number and volume of takeover
transactions outside the US outpaced deal volume inside the US.
The impact of the financial crisis on the takeover market is clearly visible in Figure 1. The
total value of announced takeover deals was around USD 700 billion in 2007 and dropped
to USD 100 billion in 2009. The deterioration in credit market conditions increased the
financing costs of acquisitions and the macroeconomic uncertainty led many companies
to postpone larger investments like acquisitions. The minimum of takeover volume in my
whole sample occurred in 1991 with a volume of just USD 11 billion when the takeover
market had to recover from the junk bond financed merger wave of the late 1980s. The
maximum of takeover volume is in 2007 with USD 710 billion. In terms of number of
deals the minimum is in 1991 and the maximum in 1999.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the total sample of takeover deals as well as for
takeover deals inside and outside of the United States. The first row of Table 1 shows
the offer premium computed as (OP−P )/P , where OP is the offer price and P the stock
price 20 days prior to the announcement date. The average takeover premium is 39.5%
and a comparison between Panel B and Panel C suggests a slightly higher premium paid
for US companies compared to companies outside of the US. The second row of Table
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1 presents the difference between the offer price and the 52-week high of the target
company’s stock scaled by the 52-week high. The 52-week high is thereby computed
as the highest stock price of the target from 385 days before the announcement until
20 days before the announcement. On average acquirers pay a premium 2.5% above
the 52-week high of the stock. This result is in line with the work of Baker et al. [58]
showing a clustering of offer prices slightly above the 52-week high. Also when the 52-
week high is used as a reference point to determine the offer premium, prices paid to US
target shareholders seem to be more favorable compared to other countries. Shareholder
protection in the US is in general better compared to other countries, which can be an
explanation for the differences in premiums paid to target shareholders.
Most of the other deal characteristics do not show interesting differences between the US
and other countries. Around 13% of deals are leveraged buy-outs, 6% of the deals are
hostile, 20% of the deals are financed with stock and for 40% of the deals the acquirer
is private. The only deal characteristic being significantly different between the US and
international markets is the number of tender offers. In the US only 32% of takeover
deals are classified as tender offer whereas 66.7% of the deals outside of the US are
tender offers. Compared to a merger or acquisition agreement target shareholders are
approached directly by the acquirer in a tender offer. A tender offer has the advantage
of a higher speed of execution and a higher chance of shareholder approval. Therefore
it should be the preferred form for an acquisition bid. A reason for the lower share of
tender offers in the US compared to other countries can be the ”Best Price Rule”. In
order to curb the practice of greemailing during the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s
the Securities and Exchange Commision (SEC) introduced the ”Best Price Rule”. This
rule forces an acquirer to pay the same price per share for every shareholder including the
management of the company. Crucially, this also included employment compensation,
severance or other employee benefit arrangements of security holders of the target. Due
to these strict requirements tender offers became less attractive for bidders beginning in
1986. In 2006 the ”Best Price Rule” was amended to exempt the aforementioned items
which led to a significant increase in the number of tender offers afterwards.
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3.3.2 Institutional Trading Data
I obtain institutional trading data from Ancerno, a trading cost consultant. The sample
period of the Ancerno data spans the period from January 1999 to December 2010 and
the analysis focuses on data for the U.S. equity market. As a stock identifier Ancerno
provides a cusip which allows me to match the institutional trading data to my sample
of takeovers from SDC. I am able to match 1601 takeover transactions and Table 2
provides summary statistics for this subsample of transactions.
A visual inspection suggests that the distribution of deal characteristics is very similar to
the broader sample reported in Table 1 Panel 3. With an average market capitalization
of USD 990 million targets in the sample matched with Ancerno are however larger than
targets in the broader sample (average market capitalizaion USD 723 million). As the
average target size grows over time the larger target size is due to the shorter time period
of the matched sample. Another explanation is the preference of institutional investors
for larger stocks reported by for example Gompers and Metrick [83].
The Ancerno database is used by several recent academic studies including Puckett and
Yan [84], Franzoni and Plazzi [85] and Jegadeesh and Tang [55]. Ancerno receives data
either from pension funds or directly from money managers. The institution sending the
data is identified with the clientcode, but Ancerno also provides a managercode identi-
fying the institution managing the assets. Following prior literature this paper focuses
on the institution managing the assets and I define a daily trade as the aggregation of
all executions in the same stock, at the same side and at the same date by one manager.
For every trade Ancerno provides several variables besides the already mentioned ones
including the execution price and the commisions paid.
Panels B to D provide summary statistics for the trading of institutional investors in
takeover targets during the period from -200 days before the announcement until the
completion or the withdrawal of the takeover. Takeover deals are kept in the sample
until a maximum of 200 days after the announcement. The different panels present
statistics separately for the full sample, the pre-announcement and post-announcement
period. My full sample includes a total of 728 different managers. For a single deal,
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on average 16 to 25 of them are trading the target stock and the average trade size is
between USD 1 million and USD 1.4 million. The distribution of the dollar trade volume
is however highly skewed with the median dollar trade being between USD 68000 and
USD 93000.
Besides the amount of institutional trading another interest of this paper are also the
trading costs of institutional investors before and during the takeover deal. Trading costs
can be split into two parts. The first part are the commisions paid for the execution of
the trade. Panels B to D suggest that average commisions are equal to 10 basis points of
the stock price and median commisions are around 5 basis points. The second part are
price impact costs. Similar to Anand et al. [86], I use the execution shortfall to measure
price impact costs. Execution shortfall is defined as
ES(t) =
Pl(t)− P0(t)
P0(t)
D(t),
where Pl(t) is the volume-weighted execution price, P0(t) is last day’s closing price of
the stock and D(t) is a categorical variable equal to 1 for buy trades and equal to -
1 for sell trades. Anand et al. [86] use the opening price of the stock as a pre-trade
benchmark. The difference between using the last day’s closing price and the opening
price are however negligible. Panels B to D of Table 2 suggest institutional investors’
price impact costs are around 4 basis point before the announcement, 2 basis points
after the announcement and around 3 basis points for the full sample.
3.4 Institutional Exit and the 52-Week High
This section examines the trading behavior of institutional investors around takeover
announcements and tests whether offer prices exceeding the 52-week high lead to an
excessive liquidity demand from institutional investors. Following Jegadeesh and Tang
[55] I study the net trading volume of institutional investors defined as the dollar volume
bought minus dollar volume sold divided by the market capitalization of the stock.
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Figure 2 plots the net trading volume of institutional investors from -10 days to +10 days
around the takeover announcement for offer price below and above the 52 week high.
In order to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers the top graph of Figure
2 shows the average net trading volume and the bottom graph shows the more robust
median. Figure 2 does not exhibit a particular trading pattern in the pre-announcement
period. The mean net trading volume seems to be slightly negative and the median is
close to zero for both sub-groups. After the announcement institutional investors sell
large amounts of their holdings in the target stock in particular when the offer price is
above the 52-week high. At the announcement date institutional investors sell around
0.6% of the target company for offer prices above the 52-week and 0.4% for offer prices
below the 52-week high. Thus, offer prices exceeding the target stock’s 52-week high
increase the trade imbalance by 50%. The median shown in the bottom graph draws
an even clearer picture with institutional investors selling 2.4 times more when the offer
price exceeds the 52-week high. The difference in the trade imbalance among these two
sub-groups does not vanish after the announcement date. Indeed, institutional investors
sell more given the offer price is above the chosen reference point on every day after the
announcement date.
The univariate results are in line with the hypothesis that offer prices above the target
stock’s 52-week high lead to an excessive liquidity demand. To test whether the effect
is significant after controlling for other drivers of the trading behavior of institutional
investors after and at the announcement I use multivariate regressions in Table 3. The
dependent variable in the regressions is the cumulated net trading volume between the
announcement date and the 10th day after the announcement. In column 1 a dummy
equal to one for offer prices above the 52-week high is used as an independent variable.
For offer prices above the 52-week high institutional investors sell 0.8% more of the
target company at the announcement date and in the first 10 trading days after the
announcement. In column 3 I use the difference between the offer price and the 52-week
high. The results suggest an increase of institutional selling of 0.1% for an increase of
the offer price of 10% compared to the 52 week high. Columns 5 and 7 of Table 3 repeat
the results including time fixed effects without a significant change in the results.
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Jegadeesh and Tang [55] find a number of other deal characteristics correlated with the
magnitude of institutional selling after the announcement date. First, I include the offer
premium measured as the difference between the offer price and the stock price 20 days
before the takeover announcement. Baker and Savasoglu [54] use the offer premium as a
measure of the downside risk of a takeover deal. If investors care about downside risk and
measure the downside relative to the stock price 20 days before the announcement date,
they will sell more target stocks depending on the size of the offer premium. Column 2
of Table 3 however does not show a significant effect of the offer premium on net trading
volume of institutional investors.
A positive and significant effect has the stockdeal dummy. Jegadeesh and Tang [55] sug-
gest that some funds are considering the acquirers as attractive investment. Therefore,
the funds hold on to their target stocks which are eventually converted into acquirer
stocks. Another interpretation of this result are tax considerations. If an institutional
investor invested in the target stock less than 12 month before the announcement, he
would decrease his capital gains taxes by staying invested in the target stock until his
investment is only taxed with the lower long-term capital gains tax. This can even im-
ply an eventual exchange of target stock into acquirer stock. Of course, this argument
applies mainly to institutional investors having bought the target stock in the recent
past, i.e. between 1 and 6 months before the announcement. The average takeover deals
closes after 100 days or around 5 month. Hence, for an investor having bought the target
stock 10 month before the announcement it is advantageous from a tax view not to sell
immediately even in a cash deal.
In line with Jegadeesh and Tang [55] the size of the takeover deal negatively impacts
institutional trading around the takeover announcement. Column 2 of Table 3 does not
include time fixed effects. Column 4 of Table 3 however does and after controlling for
time fixed effects the tender offer dummy has a negative and significant impact on the
amount of institutional trading. As already mentioned earlier due to less regulatory
burdens tender offers are executed at a faster speed compared to other deal structures.
Furthermore, as a consequence of the faster execution, competing offers are less likely.
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Institutional investors may therefore expect low expected returns going forward and exit
their investments in the target stocks.
The final three deal characteristics included in the regressions of table 3 are a dummy
for hostile bids, a dummy for private acquirers and a dummy for leveraged buyouts. The
leveraged buyout dummy and the hostile dummy are insignificant. The private acquirer
dummy however is highly significant. Thus, institutional investors appear to be reluctant
to exit the target stock conditional on the acquirer being private. Bargeron et al. [87] find
that private acquirers pay significantly lower premiums compared to public acquirers.
If target shareholders expect a competing offer due to the low premium offered by a
private acquirer, they may hold on to their investment in the target stock.
3.5 The 52-Week High and Risk Arbitrage Returns
3.5.1 Baseline Results
Using portfolio sorts this section examines whether the increased price pressure for offer
prices above the 52-week high predicts high future abnormal returns due to a limited
number of risk averse arbitrageurs. Every month I sort takeover deals according to the
distance between the offer price and the 52-week high into three portfolios and track the
portfolios’ performance over time.
For the return computation of each individual deal I follow Mitchell and Pulvino [53].
The daily return in USD on cash deal i at time t is the target return reported in CRSP
or Compustat Global rit = rT it. For a stock deal the return computation is more
complicated as it includes a short position in the acquirer stock. The merger arbitrage
return in a stock transaction is given by rit = rT it − δ(rAit − rft)PAit−1PTit−1 , where δ is the
exchange ratio, rT it the target stock return, rAit the acquirer stock return, rft is the risk
free rate, PAit−1 and PT it−1 are the acquirer stock price and the target stock price. I
assume that the risk arbitrageur is earning the risk free rate as a short rebate. Afterwards
monthly returns are computed by compounding daily returns for every transaction. In
the portfolio analysis I define a deal as investable if it was announced before the beginning
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of the month. In case a deal is not active for the whole month, i.e. the deal closes before
the end of the month, I use the risk-free rate for the non-active days of the month. 8
Finally, I have to compute the performance of the portfolio of all transactions. Mitchell
and Pulvino [53] and Baker and Savasoglu [54] report portfolio returns for a value-
weighted or equal weighted portfolio of risk arbitrage situations.9 Equal-weighting the
returns leads to well-diversified portfolios with high-weights on small and less liquid
deals. Value-weighting the returns leads to a tilt towards larger and more liquid deals.
The resulting portfolios are however not well diversified. In my sample the largest
transaction often has a weight of more than 40%. In order to have well-diversified
portfolios tilted towards larger deals I construct rank-weighted portfolios. For the rank-
weighted portfolios the weight of deal i at time t is
wi,t =
rank(sizei,t)∑N
i=1 rank(sizei,t)
.
Using these weights I compute every month the rank weighted return of all active
takeover deals.
Panel A of Table 4 shows risk-adjusted returns (alpha) for rank-weighted portfolios using
the US sample of risk arbitrage situations. For the risk-adjustment I use the three Fama
and French [32] factors and the Carhart [15] momentum factor. Using the four factor
model the portfolio in the lowest tercile and the middle tercile have insignificant alphas
of 0.05% and 0.14% monthly. The highest tercile to the contrary generates an alpha of
0.58% monthly. With a monthly alpha of 0.53%, a long-short portfolio going long the
highest tercile and short the lowest tercile provides economically significant risk-adjusted
returns. With a t-statistic of 2.85 the long-short portfolio is also statistically significant.
I interpret these results as evidence for stock price underreaction as a consequence of
the selling pressure documented in the previous section.
Panel B of Table 4 shows portfolio returns for the international sample and Panel C for
an international sample excluding the United States. Enlarging the sample decreases
8Mitchell and Pulvino [53] assume a zero return for non-active days. Following this rule does not
change the results of my analysis
9Mitchell and Pulvino [53] also report results imposing a diversification constraint where the maxi-
mum weight of a deal is restricted to 10%.
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idiosyncratic noise in the portfolios and increases the statistical power of the tests. Thus,
while the economic magnitude of the return spread between the high and low portfolio
stays nearly the same in Panel B, the statistical significance increases. Panel C of Table
4 suggests that the results also hold outside of the United States. The small number
of deals before 1999 does not allow the construction of diversified portfolios. Panel C
therefore focuses on the period after 1998. Despite differences in the time period the
results inside and outside of the United States look very similar.
The results in Table 4 are conservative estimates. First, there is only an investment in
a takeover transaction when the transaction was announced before the beginning of the
month. Price pressure is particularly strong in the first days following the announcement.
An extended lag between the announcement of the deal and the investment into the deal
can therefore mean that returns due to a decreasing spread are missed out. Second, the
hypothetical portfolios have often large cash holdings. I assume deals becoming inactive
during the month earn the risk-free rate for the rest of the month, i.e. the proceeds of
for example a closing of a deal are invested in a cash-like asset. Around 20% of all deals
become inactive each month. The large cash holdings can understate the returns for an
investor rebalancing his portfolio in a more timely manner. Column 1 to 4 of Table 5
therefore show results using a different methodology to aggregate returns. Specifically,
I follow Baker and Savasoglu [54] and aggregate first the returns across all deals at
the daily level level and then aggregate the resulting portfolio return on the monthly
level. The results are qualitatively similar to the results reported in Table 4 Panel B,
but economically and statistically stronger. Additionally columns 5 to 8 also reports
portfolio returns using value-weights instead of the rank weights. The results remain
economically the same, but the statistical significance decreases which I attribute to the
aforementioned decreased diversification of the portfolios.
3.5.2 The Role of Risk
In the previous section I assume the Carhart [15] four factor model to be the correct
asset pricing model. While the Carhart [15] four factor model is one of the most used
asset pricing models in the academic literature, the more recent literature finds a host of
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other factors explaining the time-series and cross-sectional behavior of asset returns. In
particular since the most recent financial crisis beginning in 2008 asset pricing models
taking into account systematic exposure to market liquidity risk, funding liquidity risk,
tail risk and downside risk gained popularity.
On theoretical grounds systematic market liquidity risk seems to be a well motivated
factor to explain the returns of risk-arbitrage investments. Investors require a risk
premium for assets whose liquidity comoves positively with market wide liquidity. In
the model of Brunnermeier and Pedersen [46] exposure to liquidity risk can in particular
occur in the presence of many leveraged investors. In their model funding liquidity
shocks due to sudden investor redemptions or changes in margin constraints can lead to
a sudden decrease in market liquidity when leveraged investors have to liquidate their
positions in a very short period time. The main investors in the risk arbitrage market are
proprietary desks of investment banks and hedge funds. Hence, according to the theory
of Brunnermeier and Pedersen [46] there should be a strong link between market and
funding liquidity in the risk arbitrage market and the systematic liquidity risk should
explain parts of the returns in this market.
In column 1 of Table 6 I add the funding liquidity risk factor of Adrian et al. [45]. Adrian
et al. [45] propose an asset pricing model where expected returns depend on an asset’s
covariance with shocks to the leverage of financial intermediaries. The authors argue
that as leveraged financial intermediaries are most of the time the marginal investors
in financial markets asset prices are closely tied to their marginal value of wealth. The
marginal value of wealth of a financial intermediary on the other hand depends on its
funding capacity. Hence, the authors propose a stochastic discount factor, which is
linear in the leverage of financial intermediaries and demonstrate empirically its strong
pricing ability in the cross-section of asset return. Furthermore, to allow time-series
tests the authors construct a leverage mimicking portfolio (LMP). I add the LMP as
an additional factor to test its explanatory power for the spread portfolio. The results
reported in column 1 of Table 6 suggest that the LMP factor is not able to explain
the return spread. The same holds when I use a market liquidity risk factor instead of
a funding liquidity risk factor. In columns 2 I add the traded liquidity risk factor of
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Pastor and Stambaugh [33] to the Fama and French [32] three factors and the Carhart
[15] momentum factor. The results in Table 6 suggest that there is only a weak link
between market liquidity risk and the spread portfolio.
I use a global sample of risk arbitrage situations, but use a local asset pricing model. In
column 3 of Table 6 I use global versions of the Fama and French [32] and the Carhart
[15] factors. 10 The results using the global factors span a shorter time period as they
are only available from 1990. At least for this shorter time period using the global factor
model does not influence the results significantly.
A key insight of the seminal work by Mitchell and Pulvino [53] is the non linear risk ex-
posure of risk arbitrage returns. Specifically, Mitchell and Pulvino [53] find risk arbitrage
returns to have high systematic risk exposure in down markets and a low systematic risk
exposure in up markets. To account for the non linear risk exposure I follow Mitchell
and Pulvino [53] and run CAPM regressions separately for months with market returns
below -4% and above -4%. The results reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 sug-
gest the return spread is stronger during down markets. This is economically intuitive.
During down markets there is price pressure due to the de-leveraging of market partici-
pants (see e.g. Mitchell and Pulvino [88]). In deals with offer prices above the 52-week
high, this price pressure will be stronger as more (leveraged) arbitrageurs are invested
in these deals. Although the alphas in down markets are economically larger, they are
statistically insignificant. One explanation for the low statistical significance could be
the small sample size.
3.5.3 Alternative Explanations
In this section I explore whether other variables, correlated with ∆52, can explain the
predictive power of ∆52 in the cross-section of risk arbitrage returns.
First, I study whether my results survive after controlling for the offer premium. The
offer premium and ∆52 have a correlation of 0.33, i.e. takeovers with a high value of
10The global factors are provided on Kenneth French’s homepage http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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∆52 also have a high offer premium.11 In the model of Baker and Savasoglu [54] the
offer premium is a key determinant of the excess returns in risk arbitrage. A higher
offer premium implies a higher loss given default for an arbitrageur and hence, a higher
required risk compensation due to an increase in idiosyncratic risk.12
Second, I study whether my results survive when I control for the disposition effect. The
disposition effect describes the tendency of investors to sell winners and hold on to losers
(Shefrin and Statman [81]). In the model of Grinblatt and Han [89], the disposition effect
leads to stock price underreaction for winner stocks and stock price overreaction for loser
stocks. A takeover announcement is usually good news for investors due to the control
premium paid by the acquirer. This holds in particular when the offer price is above
the 52-week high as at least all shareholders having acquired the stock in the previous
52-weeks made a positive profit on their investment. Hence, some target shareholder
may have a higher propensity to sell their target stocks due to the disposition effect,
which could explain my results.
I use cross-sectional regressions of event time returns on ∆52, the offer premium and a
proxy for the disposition effect to test whether the effect of ∆52 survives. The event
time return is defined as the cumulative return in excess of the risk free rate from two
days after the announcement until 32 days after the announcement. The 30-day event
window ensures that most takeover deals have returns over the full event window (see
Baker and Savasoglu [54]).
Table 7 presents the results. In column 1 I only include ∆52 and consistent with the
results from the portfolio sorts, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant. In
the regressions I use standardized variables. Hence, the coefficient suggests that a one
standard deviation increase in ∆52 leads to 1% higher event time returns.
11The 52-week high is computed as the highest stock price of the target from 385 days before the
announcement until 20 days before the announcement. Hence, the offer premium is always higher or
equal to ∆52
12As pointed out earlier, Baker and Savasoglu [54] compute the offer premium as the difference between
the target stock price 2 days after the announcement and 20 days before the announcement. Merger
arbitrage spreads are usually very small however. Therefore, using the difference between the price
offered by the acquirer and the target stock price 20 days before the announcement, does not make any
difference.
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I column 2 of Table 7 I run the regression using only the offer premium. In line with
Baker and Savasoglu [54], the offer premium positively predicts risk arbitrage returns.
A one standard deviation increase in the offer premium leads to 1.23% higher event time
returns. In unreported results I also repeated the portfolio sorts from the previous section
replacing ∆52 with the offer premium. Interestingly, after controlling for systematic risk
exposures takeovers with a higher offer premium do not have higher expected returns
than takeovers with a low offer premium.
To study the role of the disposition effect, I use the capital gains overhang measure
CG of Grinblatt and Han [89]. The capital gains overhang (CG) is computed as CG =
(Pt − Rt)/Rt. Pt is the closing price at the announcement day and Rt is the market’s
cost basis defined as
Rt =
∞∑
n=1
(
Vt−n
n−1∏
τ=1
[1− Vt−n+τ ]
)
Pt−n,
where Vt is the weekly turnover in a stock at date t and Pt is the stock price. To compute
this quantity Grinblatt and Han [89] use weekly data. As it is not feasible to use an
infinite sum in the estimation, the authors use as an estimation window a maximum of
five years. Column 3 of Table 7 finds that the capital gains overhang does not have any
explanatory power for risk arbitrage returns.
Finally, in columns 4 and 5 I study all the three variables together and include other
control variables. Columns 4 and 5 find that the effect of ∆52 stays economically as well
as statistically significant after controlling for other variables. Besides the offer premium
and the capital gains overhang, I also include the deal attitude (hostile) and the target’s
market capitalization in the regressions. I include the deal attitude and the target’s
market capitalization to control for the findings of Baker and Savasoglu [54] that risk
arbitrage returns are increasing in completion risk and the target’s size.13
Overall, the findings from this section suggest that other explanations are not able to
explain my results.
13Baker and Savasoglu [54] use as a control for completion risk a transformation of the estimated deal
success probability. The deal attitude is the most important predictor of deal success however. Hence, I
use for simplicity only this variable as a proxy for completion risk. Using more complicated proxies for
completion risk does not change my results.
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3.5.4 The Role of Arbitrage Capital
Having established a robust unconditional relation between risk arbitrage returns and
offer prices above the 52-week high, I study their conditional relation. In particular,
I analyze whether the return predictive power of ∆52 varies systematically with the
risk-bearing capacity of the arbitrage sector.
To proxy for the amount of available arbitrage capital, I build on the following idea.
It is a well-known fact that mergers and acquisitions occur in cycles (see e.g. Shleifer
and Vishny [63]). Figure 1 suggests that in the sample used in this paper there were
three waves of M&A activity. There was a merger wave in the 1980s peaking around
1988. The second merger wave occurred at the end of the 1990s and the third merger
wave peaked in 2007. If capital is slowly moving into and out of merger arbitrage funds,
there will be an oversupply of arbitrage capital in times of low deal activity growth
and an undersupply of arbitrage capital in times of high deal activity growth. Such a
mechanism can be motivated for example with the work of Pastor and Stambaugh [64].
In their model investors slowly learn and update their beliefs about the returns from
active management. Due to this slow updating of beliefs investor capital potentially
does not react sufficiently as a response to a changing investment opportunity set.
Drawing on this idea, I hypothesize that at periods when deal activity significantly
grows, there is insufficient arbitrage capital to absorb the liquidity demand in takeover
deals with offer prices near the target stock’s 52-week high. The insufficient amount
of arbitrage capital during such times may drive the aforementioned return difference
between takeover deals sorted according to ∆52.
To test this explanation I divide the sample period into states of high deal activity
growth, medium deal activity growth and low deal activity growth. The different states
are thereby defined in the following way: I compute the percentage deviation of deal
volume in USD at the beginning of the month from the average deal volume in the
preceding 12 month. I then divide the sample into the three states according to the
values of this variable. Table 8 presents the results of the portfolio sorts from section
4.1. separately for states of high deal activity growth and states of low deal activity
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growth. The lowest tercile portfolio neither generates abnormal returns at times of high
deal activity growth nor at times of low deal activity growth. For the highest tercile
the results are however significantly different in the two different states. At times of
high deal activity growth the portfolio in the highest tercile generate an annual alpha of
10.4% whereas its annual alpha is only 4% at times of low deal activity growth. Hence,
slow movement of arbitrage capital across the M&A cycle offers a potential explanation
for the persistence of the results documented in the previous sections.
3.6 Additional Results
3.6.1 Transaction costs
This section asks whether the abnormal returns in risk arbitrage documented in the
previous section are robust to trading costs. As a first measure I use the Corwin and
Schultz [65] spread estimator based on daily high and low prices.14 This estimator is
particularly useful in my sample as in the earlier years bid-ask spreads are often missing
especially for stocks outside of the U.S..
As a second measure of transaction costs and I estimate transaction costs using Ancerno
trade-level data. Besides paying a spread, investors face price impact costs and direct
transaction costs like commissions. Price impact costs have a significant effect on the
scalability of investment strategies and are one of the main explanations for the negative
relationship between fund size and fund performance in the active management industry.
Keim and Madhavan [66] argue implicit costs like price impact and explicit costs like
commissions are not independent from each other. Using the total costs, i.e. the sum
of implicit and explicit costs, therefore provides a better estimate of the costs incurred
by an investor. As a measure of explicit trading costs I use the trading commissions
reported in Ancerno. For the implicit costs I use execution shortfall described in section
2. To get a first impression for the trading costs in takeover deals Figure 4 plots the
median transaction costs for different trade complexity groups. I define trade complexity
14The estimator is described in more detail in the Appendix.
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as the size of the trade compared to the average daily trading volume during the last 20
days. Mitchell and Pulvino [53] conjecture that the trading costs during the takeover
deal can be different. Therefore, figure 4 plots the trading costs for the takeover targets
before and after the announcement. 15 Figure 4 suggests that indeed the trading costs
are different. Specifically, trading for example 10% of average daily trading volume
costs 20 basis points in the pre-announcement period and only 10 basis points in the
post announcement period which suggests a significant decrease in trading costs during
the post-announcement period.
To examine trading costs in more depth, I study trading costs using pooled regressions
following Keim and Madhavan [66]. I estimate trading cost functions in three different
specifications. The first specification only uses the trade complexity as an independent
variable defined as the dollar value of the trade divided by the average daily trading
volume during the last 20 days. In the second specification I allow the trade complexity
to have a different price impact for buy and sell trades. Finally, in the third specification
I use the second specification and add a company’s market capitalization as well as a
trend variable to control for the declining transaction costs over time. Compared to my
analysis in section 3 I use in this section disaggregated data which is significantly more
noisy. In order to prevent outliers from driving my results I winsorize the data at the
5% level.
Table 9 shows results separately for targets and acquirers, before and after the acqui-
sition announcement. The after announcement period begins at the second day after
announcement to estimate the trading costs.16 The first column suggests trading 1% of
average daily trading volume of a target stock has a price impact of 0.472 basis points and
additional costs of 5.542 basis points in the form of spread costs and direct costs. This
is a decrease of more than 50% compared to the trading costs in the pre-announcement
period shown in Panel A column 4 of Table 9. Panel A column 2 of table 9 suggests
there is a small asymmetry in the price impact of buy trades and sell trades, with buy
15The post-announcement period is defined as the period from 2 days after the announcement until
deal completion. The pre-announcement period is defined as the period from 200 days before the
announcement until 2 days before the announcement
16The announcement day and the first day after the announcement are excluded from all the estima-
tions
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trades being less expensive than sell trades. Finally, in line with Keim and Madhavan
[66] trading costs are decreasing in the size of the stock and trading costs are decreasing
over time.
Overall, takeover stocks seem to be very liquid. In the model of Kyle [90] the price
impact of a trade depends on the uncertainty concerning the value of an asset as well as
on the order flow by uninformed investors. On the one hand, I documented significant
amounts of uninformed selling due to behavioral effects in section 3. On the other
hand, the results of Barber and Odean [91] suggest uninformed buying by investors is
increasing when a stock receives a lot of attention in the news or have extreme one day
returns. Both of these effects are potential explanations for the significant decrease in
trading costs after the takeover announcement.
While it is cheaper to trade takeover stocks in the post-announcement period compared
to the pre-announcement period, it becomes more expensive to trade the shares of stock
acquirers. Increasing uncertainty concerning the value of the acquirer stock is one ex-
planation for this rise in the trading costs with negative performance consequences for
a risk arbitrage strategy as the acquirer stock has to be shorted in a stock deal.
Using the two measures of transaction costs I adjust portfolio returns in order to un-
derstand whether the reference price effect is a valuable signal for an arbitrageur after
accounting for transaction costs. In practice, except for the short positions in stock
acquirers to hedge market risk, risk-arbitrage is a long-only strategy. Thus, to present
results from the viewpoint of a risk-arbitrageur I compare after-cost returns for a strat-
egy investing only in takeover deals in the highest tercile of ∆52 and a strategy investing
in a rank-weighted portfolio of all takeover transactions. As a benchmark Panel A of
Table 10 presents again results assuming no transaction costs. Panel B of Table 8 shows
results using the Corwin and Schultz [65] spread estimator. Accounting for the bid-ask
spread decreases average returns as well as alphas by around 1.5% annually for both
strategies. Hence, focusing only on the top tercile transactions does not lead to a sig-
nificant increase in transaction costs which suggests that deals with offer prices near or
above the target stock’s 52-week high are not less liquid.
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In Panels C to G of Table 10 I use the trading cost functions reported in column 3 of
Table 9 to simulate the performance of the risk arbitrage portfolios accounting for the
price impact of trades. I make three assumptions when simulating the portfolios. First,
I assume a cost conscious investor not willing to pay trading costs exceeding 100 basis
points. Second, I assume the investor does not want to become a major blockholder.
Therefore, I restrict the position size to a maximum of 5% of the outstanding shares of
the target company. In times of low deal activity or times with a large number of small
transactions these assumptions lead to an increasing fraction of capital invested in cash.
I assume the cash account is earning the risk-free rate. Third, I assume the trading cost
function estimated for the U.S. is representative for the other countries in my sample.
The difference between Panels C to G of Table 10 are the initial portfolio sizes. All the
portfolios are simulated for the period from 1985 to 2012, but the initial portfolio size
varies from USD 1 million to USD 500 million.
With an initial portfolio size of USD 1 million the transaction costs using the trading
costs from Ancerno are lower than the bid-ask spread. According to column 4 of Table
10 the average monthly trading costs are between 11.13 and 12.31 basis point using
Corwin and Schultz [65] estimate whereas they are only between 4.56 and 7.29 basis
point using the estimates from Ancerno. This is surprising as the second measure of
transaction costs even includes commissions whereas we ignore them in the first measure.
Apparently, institutional investors are mostly trading inside the bid-ask spread and thus
face significantly lower transaction costs.
With an increasing initial portfolio size monthly transaction costs rise to more than
10 basis points and the average fraction of capital invested in takeover deals decreases
significantly. For an initial portfolio size of USD 500 million the average fraction of
capital invested is only 48% for the strategy investing only in top tercile transactions
and 65% for the strategy investing all announced deals. Despite the larger cash position
the top tercile strategy however still outperforms. Over the 28 year period it generated
an annual excess return (alpha) of 1.75% (0.99%) compared to an annual excess return
(alpha) of 1.33% (-0.34%) for the strategy investing in all takeover deals.
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3.6.2 An Investment Perspective
This section studies the economic importance of the documented reference price effect
from the perspective of a risk-arbitrage arbitrageur taking into account other return
predictors in risk arbitrage as well as transaction costs. I therefore employ the para-
metric portfolio policy approach by Brandt et al. [68]. The Brandt et al. [68] approach
is particularly useful in the context of event-driven strategies as it estimates optimal
portfolio weights as linear functions of asset characteristics. Hence, it does not require
an estimation of returns, variances and covariances, but assumes the joint distribution
of returns is fully characterized by the asset characteristics.
In order to account for transaction costs I simulate risk-arbitrage portfolios using either
the proportional transaction cost estimate of Corwin and Schultz [65] or non-proportional
transaction costs estimated from Ancerno trade-level data.
3.6.2.1 Parametric Portfolio Policies
I assume an investor with power utility and risk aversion γ = 4.17 The investor chooses
portfolio weights to maximize the conditional expected utility of his portfolio return rp,t
max(wi,t)Ni=1
Et[u(rp,t)], (3.1)
where the portfolio return rp,t is defined as
∑N
i=1wi,tri,t. I estimate the weights of the
optimal portfolio policy as linear functions of deal characteristics following Brandt et al.
[68]. Let xt be the k-dimensional vector of standardized deal characteristics with mean
zero and a standard deviation of one, w¯t is the weight on all the deals under a benchmark
policy. The benchmark policy can be for example an equally weighted portfolio of deals.
The linear portfolio policy is then parameterized as
wi,t = w¯i,t +
1
Nt
θ′xi,t (3.2)
17The power utility function is defined as U(W ) = W
(1−γ)
γ
, where W is the level of wealth
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where θ is a k-dimensional vector of parameters to be estimated. The vector θ specifies
how an investor should deviate from the benchmark portfolio policy given that a deal
characteristic deviates from the cross-sectional mean by one standard deviation. Risk
arbitrageurs usually take long positions in takeover situations. Therefore, I impose the
short-sale constraint
w+i,t =
max[0;wi,t]∑N
i=1max[0;wi,t]
. (3.3)
In equation (3) the weights are truncated at zero and scaled by the sum of the new
weights. The second step ensures that the weights sum up to 1.
To obtain estimates for θ the sample analogue of equations (2) and (3) is maximized,
maxθ
1
T
T∑
t=1
u
(
N∑
i=1
max(0; w¯i,t +
1
Nt
θ′xi,t)∑N
i=1(max(0; w¯i,t +
1
Nt
θ′xi,t)
ri,t
)
. (3.4)
While equation (4) can be relatively easy maximized it is more difficult to obtain stan-
dard errors for the estimated coefficients due to the non-differentiability of wit at zero.
The non-differentiability does not allow us to compute the first order derivatives of equa-
tion (4) necessary to compute standard errors. This paper therefore uses bootstrapped
standard errors instead.
Trading is not costless. When I incorporate transaction costs I change the portfolio
return from w′trt to w′trt− c′t|wt−wt−1|. The vector ct contains the one-way transaction
costs for the different takeover deals.
3.6.2.2 Optimized Portfolios
The approach of Brandt et al. [68] allows to condition the portfolio weights on several
variables. Thus, the approach also offers an alternative to test whether other character-
istics drive out the cross-sectional importance of the difference between the 52-week high
and the offer price. As the benchmark policy I use the rank weights as described in the
previous section.18 Column 1 of Table 11 shows the performance of the rank weighted
portfolio. Over the period from 1985 to 2012 portfolio’s gross return was 9.7% annually
18Using equal weights yields the same results.
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with a standard deviation of 6.4%. Even this portfolio has a sharpe ratio of 0.9 which
is significantly higher than the sharpe ratio of the market portfolio or the sharpe ratio
of other popular investment style like value or momentum. The certainty equivalent
return is 8.8% annually. The certainty equivalent is a performance statistics particular
useful to assess investment strategies with skewed pay-off profiles like merger arbitrage
and for investors caring about moments beyond mean and variance. It is the risk-less
pay-off which gives the same utility as the risky profit from the risk arbitrage strategy
to a risk-averse investor.
In column 2 of Table 11 I estimate an optimized risk arbitrage portfolio using only the
∆ 52 Week High as a conditioning variable. Conditioning on this single variable has
a significant effect on the utility of a risk averse investor and also on other commonly
used performance statistics. The certainty equivalent increases to 12.2% annually, the
sharpe ratio to 1.326 and the CAPM alpha to 7.5% annually. Although the portfolio is
more concentrated it is still well diversified. The maximum portfolio weight in a single
deal is 8% and on average there is a positive investment in over 50% of the deals. The
results from column 2 corroborate the results from the naive portfolio sorts that an
investor should tilts its portfolio optimally towards deals where the offer prices exceeds
the 52-week high significantly.
In column 3 I add several other conditioning variables. First, I add the size of the
deal. As already mentioned,Baker and Savasoglu [54] use size as a proxy for the post-
announcement price pressure arbitrageurs have to absorb. Next, I include a stock deal
dummy, a tender dummy and a LBO dummy. Mitchell and Pulvino [53] find a higher
downside risk exposure of cash deals versus stock deals and attribute this to the financing
risk of cash deals. I conjecture that among cash deals the financing risk should be even
higher among tender offers and leveraged buyouts. Tender offers are sensitive to adverse
movements in the market as they fall under Regulation T. Hence, when the collateral
value of the shares is decreasing due to systematic shocks, acquirers can face margin
calls with a negative impact on a deal’s success probability. Due to the extensive use of
leverage, LBOs are in general very sensitive to adverse developments in the equity and
credit markets. Thus, if an investor cares about downside risk, he will tilt away from cash
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financed deals and in particular from tender offers and LBOs. Finally, I include the offer
premium measured as the offer price minus the target price before the announcement,
the sign of the arbitrage spread at the beginning of the month, a dummy equal to one
for hostile deals and a dummy for private acquirers. The economic intuition to include
the offer premium and the hostile dummy was already discussed. A negative arbitrage
spread suggests that the market expects a positive improvement of the bid. The private
acquirer dummy is included due to its high correlation with institutional selling reported
in Table 3.
Most of the variables seem to be unimportant from the perspective of a risk averse
risk arbitrageur according to the results reported in Table 11 column 3. The only
conditioning variables significantly affecting the utility of the investor are ∆ 52 Week
High, Tender and Arbitrage Spread< 0. The addition of the other conditioning variables
improves the performance of the risk arbitrage strategy in the range of 25% to 45%
percent. Contrary to the initial conjecture a risk averse investor however optimally tilts
his portfolio towards tender offers and not away.
In columns 4 to 6 I incorporate transaction costs into the portfolio decision. As an
estimate for the one-way transaction costs I use the Corwin and Schultz [65] spread
estimator based on daily high and low prices.19This estimator is particularly useful in
my sample as in the earlier years bid-ask spreads are often missing especially for stocks
outside of the U.S.. Column 5 and 6 suggest transaction costs do not have a strong
impact on the parameter estimates of the optimal portfolio policy. The impact on average
annual return is similar to Mitchell and Pulvino [53] around 1.5%.20 Sharpe ratios and
alphas decrease by around 30%. Thus, while transaction costs have a significant impact
on the performance of the optimized risk arbitrage strategy, it is still a highly profitable
strategy.
The results reported in Table 11 are in-sample. Although the risk of over-fitting using
the Brandt et al. [68] is significantly smaller compared to other approaches, I estimate
the portfolio policy also out-of sample. The 10 year period from 1985 to 1994 is used as
19The estimator is described in more detail in the Appendix.
20Mitchell and Pulvino [53] report in their Table 7 the impact of indirect transaction costs on a
hypothetical fund with assets under management of USD 1 million
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the initial estimation period. The coefficients of the initial portfolio policy are then used
for the next 12 month, i.e. for 1995. Afterwards, the portfolio policy is re-estimated
every year using an expanding window.
In order to see the importance of my key variable ∆52 for the portfolio policy I plot in
figure 3 the estimated parameter for this variable together with the bootstrapped 95%
confidence interval. The parameter is slightly increasing over time and the confidence
intervals suggest it is always significantly different from zero. Conditioning the portfolio
decision on ∆52 is however not only statistically significant, but also economically. Col-
umn 2 of Table 12 suggests an increase of 3.3% in the annual certainty equivalent when
an investor conditions his portfolio decision on ∆52.
Transaction costs have again a significant impact on the performance of the optimized
portfolios as well as on the rank-weighted portfolio. On average transaction costs reduce
the returns by around 1.5% annually.
3.6.2.3 Are the Profits scalable
I use the trading cost functions reported in column 3 of Table 9 to simulate the perfor-
mance of optimized risk arbitrage portfolios accounting for the price impact of trades
and direct costs like commissions . Again, I make the three assumptions stated in sec-
tion 4.3.3 when simulating the portfolios. My simulated portfolios are out-of-sample
and therefore the trading period is from 1995 to 2012. As a starting value I assume
a portfolio of USD 10 million, which is close to the median assets under management
(AUM) of a hedge fund at the end of 1994. 21 I compare the optimized risk arbitrage
portfolio with price impact to the optimized portfolios without price impact and pro-
portional transaction costs as well as to the non-optimized risk-arbitrage portfolio with
price impact.
Figure 5 indicates a substantial influence of the price impact costs on portfolio perfor-
mance. The optimized portfolio without transaction costs generated an average annual
alpha of 8.4% during the sample period and had a sharpe ratio of 1.8. Proportional
21An analysis of the Lipper Tass hedge fund database suggests an average AUM of USD 57 million
and a median AUM of USD 12 million in December 1994
Chapter 3. Behavioral Factors in Risk Arbitrage 108
transaction costs decrease the alpha by 2.2% to 6.2% and the sharpe ratio decreases to
1.3. Finally, incorporating price impact costs leads to an annual alpha of 4.2% and a
sharpe ratio of 1.22. While this is a significant performance decrease compared to the
no transaction cost case, the optimized portfolio still performs better than the rank-
weighted portfolio. Interestingly, using raw returns the performance difference between
the optimized and the rank-weighted portfolio is not very large judging from the graph
in figure 5. There are however large differences in the alphas and sharpe ratios of the
strategies. The optimized strategy has an alpha which is 2.2% per year higher than the
alpha of the rank-weighted strategy and the sharpe ratios is also significantly higher (1.22
versus 0.79). In unreported results I find the optimized strategy has a market exposure
of only 0.05 compared to a market exposure of 0.2 for the rank-weighted strategy.
Finally, I study how the portfolio performance of the optimized portfolio changes when
I vary the initial portfolio size. I start with USD 10 million and increase the initial
portfolio size in steps of USD 10 million up to an initial portfolio value of USD 500
million. Figure 6 plots the evolution of annual alphas. The annual alpha decreases in
a convex fashion and starting from an initial portfolio size of around USD 200 million
the alphas drop below 2. Hence, assuming a hypothetical management fee of 2% the
strategy wouldn’t have delivered any alpha to investors for an initial portfolio exceeding
USD 200 million.
3.7 Conclusion
Prior research suggests that the abnormal returns in risk arbitrage are a compensation
for liquidity provision to exiting shareholders. The literature however lacks explanations
why this liquidity demand arises in the first place. Our understanding of the abnormal
profits in merger arbitrage is therefore incomplete.
This paper provides evidence consistent with a behavioral explanation for the post-
announcement liquidity demand and merger arbitrage profits. Importantly, I show that
behavioral biases are not only present among retail investor, but also among institutional
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investors. This implies that the abnormal returns in merger arbitrage may persist despite
an increasing institutionalization of equity markets.
A market inefficiency can only persist if there is not enough rational arbitrage capital
to correct it. The results of this paper suggest that arbitrage capital reacts too slowly
to the strong cyclicality of the M&A market, which lets market inefficiencies persist at
least in certain states of the world.
The M&A market is highly discussed in the media and merger arbitrage is a well-
known and simple alternative trading strategy. Therefore, to study the causes and
the persistence of pricing inefficiencies in this market provides a good starting point to
understand inefficiencies in other markets.
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Appendix
A.1 Proportional Trading Costs
I use the spread estimator (S) of Corwin and Schultz [65] defined as
S =
2(eα − 1)
1 + eα
. (A.1)
For a deeper understanding of the estimator the reader should consult the work of Corwin
and Schultz [65]. Here, I only state the equations used to compute the estimator.
α =
√
2β −√β
3− 2√2 −
√
γ
3− 2√2 , (A.2)
where
γ =
[
ln
(
H0t,t+1
L0t,t+1
)]2
(A.3)
and
β =
1∑
j=0
[
ln
(
H0t+j
L0t+j
)]2
. (A.4)
H0t+j and L
0
t+j stand for high and low price on day t+ j and H
0
t,t+1 and L
0
t,t+1 stand for
two day high and low prices in the period from t to t+ 1.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics Takeover Transactions
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of takeover transactions from
Thomson Financial. The sample starts with all change of control transactions of pub-
licly listed targets in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Japan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United King-
dom. For the final sample following filters are applied (1) In the US I only keep deals
where I am able match the cusip of the target provided by SDC with the CRSP daily
tapes. For all other countries I require a valid match between a target’s cusip (Canada),
sedol (rest of the world) or name with the Compustat Global Security Daily files. For
equity financed deals I furthermore require a valid match between the acquirer’s cusip,
sedol or name and CRSP or Compustat, (2) A deal has to be pure cash or pure stock
financed. For stock financed deals I require a valid exchange ratio from SDC; (3) deals
with negative bid premia, initial arbitrage spreads of more than 100% or smaller than
-20% are deleted; (4) deals with a value of less than USD 10 million are deleted. The
”Offer Premium” is defined as the difference between the offer price and the target
stock price 20 days prior to announcement scaled by the target stock price 20 days
prior to announcement. ”∆ 52” is defined as the difference between the offer price
and the target stock’s 52-week high scaled by the target stock 52-week high. ”Target
Size” is the target’s market capitalization in USD billions. All the other variables are
dummies
Obs Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pct. Median 75th Pct.
Panel A: International
Offer Premium 7740 0.395 0.308 0.187 0.333 0.530
∆ 52 Week High 7740 0.025 0.301 -0.130 0.032 0.198
Target size 7740 0.711 2.822 0.0440 0.125 0.418
Tender 7740 0.448 0.497 0 0 1
Stock 7740 0.201 0.401 0 0 0
Hostile 7740 0.0610 0.239 0 0 0
LBO 7740 0.135 0.341 0 0 0
Private 7740 0.43 0.49 0 0 1
Completed 7740 0.750 0.433 0 1 1
Panel B: US
Offer Premium 4888 0.424 0.313 0.209 0.360 0.563
∆ 52 Week High 4888 0.063 0.310 -0.111 0.085 0.247
Target size 4888 0.723 2.989 0.0452 0.130 0.431
Tender 4888 0.320 0.467 0 0 1
Stock 4888 0.215 0.411 0 0 0
Hostile 4888 0.0620 0.241 0 0 0
LBO 4888 0.139 0.346 0 0 0
Private 4888 0.38 0.49 0 0 1
Completed 4888 0.796 0.403 1 1 1
Panel C: International ex US
Offer Premium 2852 0.346 0.293 0.154 0.284 0.474
∆ 52 Week High 2852 -0.040 0.273 -0.149 0.004 0.103
Target size 2852 0.689 2.499 0.0426 0.117 0.401
Tender 2852 0.667 0.471 0 1 1
Stock 2852 0.176 0.381 0 0 0
Hostile 2852 0.0593 0.236 0 0 0
LBO 2852 0.128 0.334 0 0 0
Private 2852 0.51 0.50 0 1 1
Completed 2852 0.670 0.470 0 1 1
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics Ancerno
This table shows summary statistics for the matched sample of US takeover transactions
and trade level data provided by Ancerno. Panel A shows summary statistics for the
takeover targets. Panel A to Panel C provide trading statistics for target stocks for the
full sample, before the takeover announcement and after the takeover announcement.
”Managers” is the number of managers in the Ancerno database trading the target
stock. ”Price Impact” is execution shortfall (ES) defined as ES(t) = Pl(t)−P0(t)P0(t) D(t),
where Pl(t) is the average execution price, P0(t) is the prior day’s closing price and D(t)
is the direction of the trade. Commisions per stock traded are expressed as a fraction
of prior day’s closing pricing. Total costs are commissions plus price impact and trade
size is expressed in thousand dollars.
Obs Mean Stdev. 25th Pct. Median 75th Pct.
Panel A: Deal Characteristics - Ancerno Match
Offer Premium 1601 0.43 0.33 0.21 0.36 0.58
∆ 52 Week High 1601 0.02 0.32 -0.16 0.05 0.20
Target Size 1601 0.99 3.25 0.07 0.21 0.70
Tender 1601 0.27 0.45 0 0 1
Stockdeal 1601 0.19 0.40 0 0 0
Hostile 1601 0.02 0.13 0 0 0
LBO 1601 0.14 0.35 0 0 0
Private 1601 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Completed 1601 0.86 0.35 1 1 1
Panel B: Full Sample - Trading Statistics
Managers 1601 25.25 27.26 4.00 15.00 38.00
Price Impact 1601 0.03 2.19 -0.82 0 0.88
Commisions 1601 0.10 1.76 0.02 0.05 0.12
Total Cost 1601 0.13 2.81 -0.73 0.09 0.98
Trade Size 1601 1214 7120 15.42 77.21 418.20
Panel C: Before Announcement- Trading Statistics
Managers 1601 22.43 23.79 4.00 14.00 34.00
Price Impact 1601 0.04 2.28 -0.95 0 1.02
Commisions 1601 0.11 2.16 0.02 0.06 0.13
Total Cost 1601 0.14 3.14 -0.86 0.11 1.12
Trade Size 1601 1038 5887 13.93 68.63 363.50
Panel D: After Announcment - Trading Statistics
Managers 1601 16.53 19.19 3.00 9.00 24.00
Price Impact 1601 0.02 2.04 -0.62 0 0.66
Commisions 1601 0.09 0.79 0.01 0.05 0.11
Total Cost 1601 0.11 2.19 -0.54 0.07 0.75
Trade Size 1601 1494 8713 18.22 93.74 519.50
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Table 3.4: The 52 Week High and Risk Arbitrage Returns
At the beginning of each month all announced takeover transactions are sorted into
three size rank weighted portfolios according to ∆52, defined as the difference between
the offer price and the target stock’s 52-week high scaled by the target stock 52-week
high. Monthly excess returns of the portfolios are regressed on the market factor (MK-
TRF), the small minus big factor (SMB) and the high minus low factor (HML) of Fama
and French [32] factors as well as on momentum factor (UMD) of Carhart [15]. High-
Low is a long-short portfolio going long the portfolio with takeover stocks in the highest
∆52 tercile and short the takeover stocks in the lowest ∆52 tercile. *,**,*** denotes
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
Low Medium High High - Low
Panel A: US(1985-2012)
Excess Return (in % per year) 3.67 4.00 8.84 4.98
Sharpe Ratio 0.35 0.51 1.00 0.41
MKTRF 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.18*** -0.14***
(9.70) (10.21) (6.53) (-3.37)
SMB 0.14*** 0.07* 0.15*** 0.01
(3.00) (1.90) (3.89) (0.19)
HML 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.11** -0.04
(2.89) (3.29) (2.51) (-0.64)
UMD -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
(-0.17) (-0.41) (-1.52) (-0.86)
Alpha (in % per month) 0.05 0.14 0.58*** 0.53***
(0.34) (1.29) (4.76) (2.85)
Observations 336 336 336 336
R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.03
Panel B: International (1985-2012)
Excess Return (in % per year) 3.31 4.32 8.83 5.36
Sharpe Ratio 0.33 0.57 1.23 0.57
Alpha (in % per month) 0.00 0.14 0.60*** 0.59***
(0.03) (1.32) (5.67) (3.99)
Panel C: International excluding the US (1999-2012)
Excess Return (in % per year) 0.71 4.80 7.39 6.64
Sharpe Ratio 0.06 0.51 0.63 0.45
Alpha (in % per month) -0.06 0.35* 0.56** 0.62*
(-0.24) (1.74) (2.09) (1.88)
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Table 3.6: The Role of Risk
At the beginning of each month all announced takeover transactions are sorted into
three rank weighted portfolios according to ∆52, defined as the difference between
the offer price and the target stock’s 52-week high scaled by the target stock 52-week
high. The table reports results for regressions of the portfolios’ monthly excess returns
on different risk-factors. MKTRF, SMB, HML are the Fama and French [32] factors,
UMD is the momentum factor of Carhart [15], LMP is the leverage mimicking factor
of Adrian et al. [45] and PS is the traded liquidity risk factor of Pastor and Stambaugh
[33]. Column 3 uses the global versions of the Fama and French [32] and Carhart [15]
factors. In column 4 a down market is defined as a contemporaneous market return
below -4%. In column 5 an up market is defined as a contemporaneous market return
above -4%. *,**,*** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance
level respectively.
LMP PS Global FactorsDown MarketUp Market
MKTRF -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.16 -0.14***
(-3.71) (-4.77) (-3.55) (-1.27) (-3.05)
SMB -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(-0.24) (-0.10) (-0.41)
HML -0.19 -0.07 -0.11
(-1.58) (-1.20) (-1.57)
UMD -0.12* -0.05 -0.01
(-1.75) (-1.47) (-0.60)
LMP 0.15
(1.19)
PS -0.04
(-1.06)
Alpha 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.53*** 0.73 0.48***
(3.61) (3.89) (3.16) (0.71) (2.71)
Observations 306 306 240 46 290
R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
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Table 3.7: Alternative Explanations
This table shows OLS regressions of 30 day excess even returns on ∆52, defined as the
difference between the offer price and the target stock’s 52-week high scaled by the
target stock 52-week high, and a number of control variables. Offer Premium is defined
as the difference between the offer price and the target stock price 20 days prior to an-
nouncement scaled by the target stock price 20 days prior to announcement; CG is the
capital gains overhang measure of Grinblatt and Han [89], Size is the log market capi-
talization of the target, hostile and stockdeal are dummies equal to 1 for an unfriendly
takeover offer and payment in stock, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses and
all standard are clustered at the monthly level. *,**,*** denotes statistical significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆52 1.01*** 0.72*** 0.66***
(5.61) (3.92) (3.43)
Offer Premium 1.24*** 1.01*** 0.98***
(6.86) (5.53) (4.97)
CG 0.03 -0.17 -0.27
(0.17) (-1.14) (-1.62)
Size -0.21
(-1.56)
Hostile 3.03***
(4.40)
Stockdeal -0.85**
(-2.49)
Constant 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.19***
(8.29) (8.24) (8.22) (8.33) (6.77)
Observations 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,831 7,732
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02
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Table 3.9: Transaction Costs
This table shows estimates of transaction costs in takeover stocks. The dependent
variable is the total transaction cost defined as the sum of execution shortfall and
commissions as a fraction of the share price in basis points. Execution shortfall is
defined as ES(t) = Pl(t)−P0(t)P0(t) D(t), where Pl(t) is the average execution price, P0(t) is
the prior day’s closing price and D(t) is the direction of the trade. Size is the natural
logarithm of a stock’s market capitalization in thousand. Trend is defined as (Year-
1999). Complexity is the dollar volume of a trade divided by the average daily trading
volume of the stock during the previous 20 days. Buy is a dummy equal to one for buy
trades. Sell is a dummy equal to one for sell trades. In order to prevent outliers to drive
the results all the regressions are estimated using robust regression techniques. *,**,***
denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.
Trading Costs in Target Stocks
After Announcement Before Announcement
Buy*Complexity 0.483*** 0.377*** 1.004*** 0.937***
(3.571) (2.714) (10.34) (9.366)
Sell*Complexity 0.468*** 0.389*** 1.255*** 1.195***
(5.077) (4.102) (12.39) (11.54)
Trend -0.0402 -0.238*
(-0.330) (-1.799)
Size (in logs) -0.893*** -0.628**
(-3.764) (-2.345)
Complexity 0.472*** 1.124***
(5.957) (15.14)
Intercept 5.547*** 5.546*** 19.22*** 7.881*** 7.882*** 18.59***
(14.38) (14.38) (5.181) (18.90) (18.91) (4.589)
Observations 103,060 103,060 103,060 223,967 223,967 223,967
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Trading Costs in Stock Acquirers
Buy*Complexity 1.273*** 1.350*** 1.114*** 1.130***
(5.063) (5.214) (4.706) (4.638)
Sell*Complexity 1.811*** 1.892*** 1.638*** 1.653***
(5.915) (6.066) (6.414) (6.359)
Trend -0.133 0.157
(-0.558) (0.804)
Size (in logs) 0.625 0.0456
(1.582) (0.133)
Complexity 1.486*** 1.354***
(7.386) (7.526)
Intercept 8.007*** 7.994*** -2.081 6.813*** 6.813*** 5.358
(10.31) (10.30) (-0.299) (9.917) (9.917) (0.884)
Observations 66,220 66,220 66,220 91,085 91,085 91,085
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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Table 3.11: In-Sample Results
Long-only optimal portfolio policy parameters are estimated for all cash and stock
deals over the 1985-2012 sample period for different specifications: (I) corresponds to
a size ranked merger arbitrage portfolio; (II) uses only ∆52 as a conditioning variable;
(III) adds the offer premium, the log target size and dummies for stock deals, tender
offers, LBOs, private acquirers and hostile transactions. In the optimization, the risk
aversion parameter is set to 4. The first set of rows shows the estimated parameters
of the portfolio policy and their associated standard errors. The standard errors are
estimated using the bootstrap and statistically significant parameters are in bold. The
second set of rows displays the certainty-equivalent return, the average return, standard
deviation of return, the sharpe ratio, the CAPM alpha and the four factor alpha.All
the statistics are annualized. The third set of rows shows the average absolute portfolio
weight, the minimum and maximum portfolio weight, the average sum of negative
weights in the portfolio and the average fraction of negative weights in the portfolio.
Columns 1 to 3 show results without transactions and columns 4 to 6 show results
including proportional transaction costs. Proportional transaction costs are estimated
using the Corwin and Schultz [65] bid-ask spread estimator.
Excluding Transaction Costs Including Transaction Costs
Rank Optimized Rank Optimized
I II III I II III
θ∆52 4.50 3.42 4.40 3.87
1.34 1.77 1.45 1.36
θSIZE -3.12 -2.55
1.56 1.29
θSTOCKDEAL 2.64 1.00
2.10 1.22
θTENDER 5.19 4.56
1.90 1.56
θLBO -1.00 -1.90
1.22 1.12
θOFFERPREMIUM -0.19 0.37
1.69 1.37
θSPREAD<0 -5.66 -4.92
1.36 1.17
θHOSTILE -1.87 -1.12
2.34 1.85
θPRIV ATE 1.06 0.91
1.68 1.31
CE 0.088 0.122 0.150 0.071 0.104 0.118
Mean Return 0.097 0.133 0.159 0.080 0.115 0.128
Stdev 0.064 0.070 0.064 0.064 0.070 0.065
Sharpe Ratio 0.905 1.326 1.884 0.638 1.074 1.360
αCAPM (per year) 0.037 0.075 0.109 0.021 0.059 0.077
αFF4 (per year) 0.031 0.072 0.107 0.015 0.056 0.076
|wt| 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.015 0.015 0.015
min 0.00053 0 0 0.001 0.000 0.000
max 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.029 0.075 0.077∑
w tI(w t < 0) 0 0 0 0.000 0.000 0.000∑
I(w t ≤ 0) 0 0.39 0.41 0.000 0.385 0.423
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Table 3.12: Out-of-Sample Results
In the out-of-sample results, I use data until December 1994 to estimate the parameters
of the long-only portfolio policy and then form out-of-sample portfolios using those
parameters in the next year. Every subsequent year, the portfolio policy is reestimated
using the enlarged sample. Results for the out-of-sample period from 1995 to 2012 are
reported for different specifications: (I) corresponds to a size ranked merger arbitrage
portfolio; (II) uses only ∆52 as a conditioning variable; (III) adds the offer premium, the
log target size and dummies for stock deals, tender offers, LBOs, private acquirers and
hostile transactions. In the optimization, the risk aversion parameter is set to 4. The
first set of rows displays the certainty-equivalent return, the average return, standard
deviation of return, the sharpe ratio, the CAPM alpha and the four factor alpha.All
the statistics are annualized. The third set of rows shows the average absolute portfolio
weight, the minimum and maximum portfolio weight, the average sum of negative
weights in the portfolio and the average fraction of negative weights in the portfolio.
Columns 1 to 3 show results without transactions and columns 4 to 6 show results
including proportional transaction costs. Proportional transaction costs are estimated
using the Corwin and Schultz [65] bid-ask spread estimator.
Excluding Transaction Costs Including Transaction Costs
Rank weighted Optimized Rank weighted Optimized
I II III I II II
CE 0.077 0.110 0.116 0.061 0.095 0.094
Mean Return 0.083 0.116 0.123 0.067 0.101 0.100
Stdev 0.052 0.053 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.055
Sharpe Ratio 1.022 1.645 1.702 0.717 1.360 1.298
αCAPM (per year) 0.037 0.075 0.084 0.022 0.061 0.062
αFF4 (per year) 0.033 0.073 0.084 0.018 0.058 0.062
|wt| 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.012
min 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
max 0.029 0.067 0.066 0.029 0.067 0.065∑
wtI(w t < 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∑
I(wt ≤ 0) 0.000 0.385 0.408 0.000 0.383 0.403
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Figure 3.1: Takeover Activity
The top graph shows the annual number of takeover transactions in the US and in
an international sample excluding the US. The bottom graph shows the annual dollar
volume in USD billions of takeover transactions in the US and in an international
sample excluding the US.
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Figure 3.2: Net trading volume around takeover announcements
The top graph shows the average aggregate net trading volume of institutional investors
as a fraction of total shares outstanding around takeover announcements (in %) sep-
arately for deals with offer prices above the 52-week high and deals with offer prices
below the 52-week high. The bottom graph shows the median aggregate net trading vol-
ume of institutional investors as a fraction of total shares outstanding around takeover
announcements (in %) separately for deals with offer prices above the 52-week high and
deals with offer prices below the 52-week high.
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Figure 3.3: Confidence Interval
The solid line shows the annual parameter θ∆52 for an optimal long-only parametric
portfolio policy using only ∆52 as a conditioning variable. The portfolio policy is esti-
mated using an expanding window beginning in December 1994 and ending in December
2011. The dashed lines show the 95% bootstrapped confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Trading Cost
This graph plots the median trading costs for takeover targets before and after the
takeover announcement for different trade sizes. I divide all institutional transaction
into 20 bins according their complexity. Complexity is defined as trade size divided by
average daily trading volume in the previous 20 days. The y-axis plots median trading
costs in basis point. The x-axis shows the median complexity in % of average daily
trading volume for each bin.
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Figure 3.5: Out-of-Sample Returns in Risk Arbitrage
This graph shows the performance of different risk arbitrage portfolios. All the opti-
mized portfolios are estimated out-of-sample using all eight deal characteristics shown
in Table 7. The sample period runs from January 1995 to December 2012. The port-
folios adjusted for non-proportional transaction costs have an initial portfolio size of
USD 10 million and the used transaction cost functions are displayed in table 9 column
3.
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Figure 3.6: Scalability in Risk Arbitrage
This graph shows annual four factor alphas in the period from January 1995 to De-
cember 2012 for different levels of initial capital (in USD millions). All the optimized
portfolios are estimated out-of-sample using all eight deal characteristics shown in Table
11 and the used transaction cost functions are displayed in table 9 column 3.
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